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Abstract
In this article, I survey some philosophical attitudes to talk concerning ‘the’
universe of sets. I separate out four different strands of the debate, namely: (i)
Universism, (ii) Multiversism, (iii) Potentialism, and (iv) Pluralism. I discuss
standard arguments and counterarguments concerning the positions and some of
the natural mathematical programmes that are suggested by the various views.
Introduction
This chapter deals with the question of what we mean when we talk about “the”
universe of sets: Do we talk about one determinate structure/universe when we
do so, or many? Perhaps the most natural view, before we have deeply engaged
with the mathematical details, is to assume that our set-theoretic axioms are about a
unique maximal set-theoretic universe. What are axioms for set theory about? Why
the sets of course!
Developments in mathematics from the latter half of the 19th century to the present
day have challenged this natural idea, however. In particular, the discovery of the
set-theoretic paradoxes and use of extensions (e.g. forcing) in proving independence
results has been argued to put pressure on the believer in a unique maximal uni-
verse of sets. A popular response has been to admit that our talk of “the” universe
of sets is really indeterminate in various ways. In this chapter, I’ll explain the dif-
ferent ways authors have answered the challenges of paradoxes and extensions, and
the mathematics that has resulted. Since this article is meant to be expository rather
than argumentative, my aim it to give a map of the terrain rather than argue for one
particular route through it (though of course I will give some evaluation as we go).
My discussion will be guided by the following questions:
(1.) What kinds of views are there about our talk concerning “the” universe of sets?
(2.) What is the status of independent questions (e.g. CH) on each view?
(3.) What are the salient challenges for the proponent of each view, and how do they
respond to them?
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(4.) What mathematical programmes are suggested by the views?
Here’s the plan: In §1 I outline the core problems in detail, in particular the set-
theoretic paradoxes and response via the iterative conception of sets (§1.1), the use
of extensions in proving independence (§1.2), and the role extensions play in prov-
ing theorems (§1.3) and formulating axioms (§1.4). I’ll then (§2) explain the Uni-
versist position that there is a unique maximal universe of set theory determining
set-theoretic truth, some arguments for and against it, and how it interprets some
of the constructions and challenges from §1 as well as some natural mathematical
programmes motivated by the position. Next (§3) I’ll examine positions that deny
that there is a single maximal universe of set theory that determines the truth value
of every sentence of set theory (let’s call this class of views Anti-Universism). Here,
we’ll consider the multiversist position that the subject matter of set theory is ac-
tually constituted by a plurality of universes (§3.1), the potentialist viewpoint that
takes set theory to be inherently modal (§3.2), the idea that there is one universe of
sets that is indeterminate (§3.3), and we’ll briefly explore some mathematical pro-
grammes associated with the views (§3.4). I’ll then (§4) consider the links between
the views essayed and the pluralist idea that we should investigate many different
set theories, and should not treat a particular one as foundationally privileged. Fi-
nally (§5) I’ll conclude with some brief remarks and suggestions for further research.
Two short remarks are needed before we get into the details:
The first concerns the use of the term “universe” in this debate and more widely.
On the one hand “universe” is often used to mean a structure in the model-theoretic
sense as a set coding a tuple of domain, constants, functions, and relations (and in
the case of “universe” specifically one with a membership relation and satisfying
some specified set-theoretic axioms). On the other hand, by “universe” one could
mean something more general and philosophical; namely the place(s) where our set-
theoretic talk is interpreted. In this paper, I mean the broader philosophical sense
of the term (though as we’ll see, for some views there is a collapse between the set-
theoretic and philosophical notion).
Second, a quick remark on the scope of the paper and how to read it. We’ll cover a
lot of ground and we’ll touch on enough material to easily fill a textbook. Obviously,
this means that I’ve had to sacrifice depth for the sake of breadth, and that some areas
will be either too easy or too difficult, contingent on the reader’s level of expertise.
My aim is threefold: First, since the last twenty years (since the early 2000s) has
seen something of an explosion in the literature on the philosophy of set theory and
how it interacts with more mathematical considerations, I hope that the piece can
help students and researchers by consolidating various ideas and concepts into one
place. Second, given the current depth of literature out there, I hope that the chapter
can serve as a general roadmap for the neophyte interested in entering into some
of the mentioned debates by helping them to navigate this difficult terrain more
easily. Where depth has been sacrificed, I hope to have provided sufficient references
to guide the reader to the details. Third, by bringing together a wide variety of
material, we can draw some connections between them that would not be possible in
a more specific research-focussed piece. Important here is the relationship between
the various positions (e.g. between Potentialism, Multiversism, and Pluralism) that
will form a backbone of the chapter. For this reason, I hope the piece will be of
interest to experts as well as relative newcomers.
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1 The Core Problems
This section will lay out the mathematical data on which the rest of the rest of the
paper will be based. In particular we’ll explain the set-theoretic paradoxes and the it-
erative conception as a response (§1.1), the adding of subsets to prove independence
(§1.2), and uses of extensions proving theorems (§1.3) and formulating axioms (§1.4).
1.1 Paradoxes
The set-theoretic paradoxes have been known since the late 1800s, and are elemen-
tary by today’s standards. The core point for the perspective of mainstream contem-
porary set theory is that it not the case (contra early Frege) that for a universe of set
theory and well-formed condition φ, there is a set containing just the sets satisfying
φ in the universe.
Given Frege’s second-order system, one could derive the following principle
about sets (rendered in today’s set-theoretic notation):
Unrestricted Comprehension. Let φ be a formula in the language of set the-
ory, then:
∃x∀y(y ∈ x↔ φ(y))
As is well known nowadays, this leads to contradictions by considering the con-
ditions “x 6∈ x”, “x = x”, and “x is an ordinal”. Thus, in ZFC-based set theory,
there is no set of non-self-membered sets, universal set or set of all ordinal numbers
(conceived of as transitive sets well-ordered by ∈).1
Remark 1. There are several other upshots one might take from the paradoxes. One
might, for example, take them as evidence for dialethism (e.g. [Priest, 2002]). Since
this chapter is (mostly) focussed on classical ZFC-based set theory, I’ll set this issue
aside, despite its interest.
Of course, there is then the challenge of saying why these well-formed conditions
do not define sets. That brings us on to:
Responding to the paradoxes: The iterative conception of set. ZFC set theory
blocks the paradoxical reasoning by placing restrictions on the level of Comprehen-
sion allowed. Specifically, instead of full Unrestricted Comprehension, we have the:
Axiom Scheme of Separation. If φ is a formula inL∈ with y not free then:
∀x∃y∀z[z ∈ y ↔ (z ∈ x ∧ φ(z))]
Essentially Separation restricts Comprehension so that the domain we extract the
set of φ from is also a set. We therefore can’t collect all satisfiers of φ into a set, just
the ones in some given set or other.
1I won’t in general include proofs, since doing so will take up far too much space. The proofs of the
paradoxes can be found in several texts, but [Giaquinto, 2002], Part II, Ch. 1 is especially thorough. The
case of ordinals in the ZFC is slightly vexed, since one depends on a particular coding of the ordinal
numbers in order to cash out the exact content of the theorem (as I’ve presented it in the text, it pertains to
von Neumann ordinals). Some authors have suggested that we might view ordinals as Urelemente, and
hence the Burali-Forti paradox as a paradox of property theory rather than set theory. See, for example,
[Menzel, 1986] and [Menzel, 2014].
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Explaining why we cannot collect all satisfiers of a condition is a problem some
have seen for the philosophy of set theory (i.e. what is it about the nature of sets
that prevents having a set of all φ?). There is some debate as to whether or not the
mere fact of the contradiction is enough.2 However, one important idea that has
been mobilised in answering this questions is that sets are given to us by the iterative
conception of set. Shoenfield expresses it as follows:
Sets are formed in stages. For each stage S there are certain stages which
are before S. At each stage S, each collection consisting of sets formed at
stages before S is formed into a set. There are no sets other than the sets
which are formed at the stages. ([Shoenfield, 1977], p. 323)
There’s lots to say about the iterative conception of set, in particular how it might
relate to the justification of axioms like ZFC.3 For now, let us note that the concep-
tion seems to block the paradoxes. If we are thinking of sets as formed in a well-
founded sequence of stages, by starting with the empty set and then taking all avail-
able sets of sets at successor stages, then we always get new sets at successor stages.
All sets are non-self-membered, and there is no set of all non-self-membered sets or
universal set since the satisfiers of the two conditions appear unboundedly in the
stages. Similarly for the Burali-Forti paradox; standard ways of picking representa-
tives for the ordinals (such as the von Neumann representation) have representatives
unboundedly in the stages, and so there is no set of all of them.4 We then (so the
thinking goes) can see why Separation is true instead of Unrestricted Comprehen-
sion: Given some set x first formed at stage Sα, all members y of x such that φ(y) are
available earlier than Sα, and so (assuming that we take all possible sets at successor
stages) there should be a set of all of the φs in x at latest at stage Sα. In this sense, it
seems that the iterative conception licences in favour of Separation and tells us why
Unrestricted Comprehension should be false.5 We will see some further discussion
of this ‘solution’ in §2.2 and §3.1.1.
The ‘stage theory’ description of the iterative conception (which can be formally
expressed6) has a corresponding theorem in ZFC. There we can define:
Definition 2. The Cumulative Hierarchy of Pure Sets composed of the Vα is defined in
ZFC as follows:
2Dummett, for example, refers to merely pointing to the fact of contradiction as to merely “wield the
big stick” ([Dummett, 1994], p26) an idea in turn taken up by [Linnebo, 2010]. Soysal, on the other hand
provides a close relative of the idea that the contradiction is enough, but with additional content given by
the underlying iterative conception (see [Soysal, 2020]).
3The literature here is huge, but (for example) [Boolos, 1971] motivates the axioms on the basis of the
iterative conception, [Boolos, 1989] doubts how far it can take us, and [Paseau, 2007] examines Boolos’
arguments. [Potter, 2004] doubts Replacement on the basis of the iterative conception, and [Maddy, 2011]
argues that we should be doubtful of its justificatory force. An introduction to some of these ideas is
available in [Linnebo, 2017], esp. Chs. 10 and 12.
4As mentioned in a previous footnote, [Menzel, 1986] argues that ordinals might be allowed to be
Urelemente. As we’re restricting to pure set theory, this isn’t so important, however if we allow arbitrary
collections of Urelemente at the first stage, then we would get a set of all ordinals at the second stage.
This idea is explored in [Menzel, 2014], with a restriction on the axiom of Replacement used to keep
things consistent.
5Interestingly though, the history here is not quite as neat as one might like. It is not really until
Zermelo (in [Zermelo, 1930]) that we start to see the idea of cumulative hierarchy appear. This was
then further integrated in Go¨del’s work on L (in [Go¨del, 1940]), but it was not until the late 1960s and
1970s that the idea of the iterative conception and its relation to ZFC were fully isolated (e.g. [Boolos,
1971]). Separation, however, was in currency long before the iterative conception was widely accepted (it
appears, for example, in [Zermelo, 1908]). See [Kanamori, 1996] for a summary of the history.
6e.g. in [Boolos, 1971].
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(i) V0 = ∅
(ii) Vα+1 = P(Vα), for successor ordinal α+ 1.
(iii) Vλ =
⋃
β<λ Vβ , for limit ordinal λ.
(iv) V =
⋃
β∈On Vβ .
We can then prove:
Theorem 3. (ZF) For any set x, there is an α such that x ∈ Vα.
There is a sense then in which the iterative conception is more than just a philo-
sophical motivation for theZFC axioms, but also (givenZF) it is just a mathematical
fact of life; every set quite simply has to belong to some Vα.
There is a philosophical question as to what extent the use of quantification over
the ordinals and the Vα allows us to divorce the iterative conception from the tempo-
ral terms in which it is initially couched. This will be treated differently by different
theorists, and we shall see some discussion of it throughout this chapter (especially
§3.2). Still, articulating an interpretation of the iterative conception and what role it
plays is an important task for each view concerning ‘the’ universe of sets.
1.2 Independence
At the turn of the 20th century, at the International Congress of Mathematicians in
Paris, Hilbert presented ten of what he considered to be the 23 most important prob-
lems facing mathematics. Number one on his list was the resolution of the Contin-
uum Hypothesis (CH); the claim that there are no cardinalities intermediate between
that of the natural numbers and that of the reals (i.e. 2ℵ0 = ℵ1). Since reals are
coded by subsets of ω, and functions from P(ω) to its subsets are coded by sets of
ordered pairs, questions like CH (as well as many other questions in set theory) de-
pend upon what subsets exist. This observation, combined with the understanding
that we can have different models of ZFC (a fact already known by the work of
Leopold Lo¨wenheim and Thoralf Skolem prior to 1920), lead to the unusual resolu-
tion of the Continuum Hypothesis (as far as the axioms of ZFC were concerned).
It was shown that CH is independent from the axioms of ZFC (i.e. ZFC 6` CH and
ZFC 6` ¬CH). Number two on Hilbert’s list of problems was to show that arithmetic
was consistent. Instrumental in answering this question was Go¨del’s Incomplete-
ness Theorems; Go¨del showed that for any recursive theory T capable of represent-
ing Primitive Recursive Arithmetic (assuming its ω-consistency), T could not prove
its own consistency sentence (i.e. the claim that there is no natural number coding a
proof of 0 = 1 from T).
These results have lead to two different kinds of independence. (i) CH is indepen-
dent from ZFC, but adding either CH or ¬CH to ZFC does not increase its strength
in the sense that both ZFC+ CH and ZFC+ ¬CH are consistent just in case ZFC is
(i.e. CH is an Orey sentence for ZFC). (ii) Adding Con(ZFC), on the other hand, does
increase theory strength; there are theories (e.g. ZFC) that we can prove consistent
in ZFC+ Con(ZFC) that we couldn’t prove consistent in ZFC.
There are several mathematical principles and techniques that have been devel-
oped as means to exploring these kinds of independence. We survey some of them
here.
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Large cardinals. One challenge when considering large cardinal axioms is that
there is no fully precise definition of what they are. However, the rough idea is that
there are certain axioms of set theory that imply the existence of cardinal numbers
with closure properties in certain models. So, for example:
Definition 4. A cardinal κ is strongly inaccessible iff it is an uncountable regular strong
limit cardinal.
defines a cardinal number that cannot be reached from below by the operations of
Powerset and Replacement. The existence of at least one such object yieldsCon(ZFC)
(and in fact much more), since if κ is strongly inaccessible then Vκ |= ZFC.
Far stronger large cardinal axioms have been defined, and there is a whole hi-
erarchy of increasing consistency strengths, that appear, as far as we can see, to be
linearly ordered. Often strength and size considerations go hand in hand, as often
a cardinal of a particular kind will contain many cardinals of another kind below it.
For example, a Mahlo cardinal is a cardinal κ that is strongly inaccessible and the set
of regular cardinals below κ is stationary. This implies the existence of many inacces-
sible cardinals (in fact κ-many) below κ. However, size and strength do not always
go hand in hand, if both superstrong and strong cardinals exist, then the least strong
cardinal is smaller than the least superstrong, however one can build a model of a
strong cardinal from a superstrong cardinal.7
The details are dealt with in detail in several places, and an excellent survey is
available in [Koellner, 2011]. Important for later (e.g. §3.1.1) is the observation that
there is no largest consistent axiom at the top of the large cardinal hierarchy. For
example, given a large cardinal axiom φ, one can come up with a stronger large
cardinals axiom:
Axiom 5. There is a Vα |= φ.
Of course this template will immediately prove the consistency of any large car-
dinal axiom φ I desire. There is nothing mathematically deep here, however, it shows
that there is no limit to the kinds of consistent large cardinal axiom we can consider.
Inner models. One of the first and most well-known inner model constructions
was developed in [Go¨del, 1940]. What Go¨del showed was that by controlling very
precisely the subsets allowed, we could (assuming that ZFC is consistent) generate
a model L of ZFC satisfying CH, and hence ¬CH is not a consequence of ZFC. More
precisely, he defined the following structure via transfinite recursion:
Definition 6. The constructible hierarchy or L is defined as follows:
(i) L0 = ∅
(ii) Lα+1 = {x| “x is definable over Lα with parameters in Lα”}.
(iii) Lλ =
⋃
α<λ Lα (for limit λ).
(iv) L =
⋃
β∈On Lβ
and then showed that L |= ZFC + CH and hence ZFC 6` ¬CH (assuming ZFC
is consistent). As one can see from its construction, we define L by keeping a very
tight control on what subsets are formed at successor stages in the recursion; we
7See [Kanamori, 2009], p. 360.
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only allow those subsets that are definable in the language of ZFC with parameters
available at prior stages.
Since Go¨del’s pioneering work, an enormous diversity of similar models, so called
‘inner models’ have been studied and discovered. This can be done by relaxing the
parameters allowed in the construction (e.g. by allowing arbitrary ordinal parame-
ters in definingHOD), allowing additional predicates into our notion of definability,
or building L over some initially specified set rather than the empty set. In partic-
ular we can build L-like models that contain certain large cardinals (L itself cannot
tolerate very strong large cardinals), a discipline known as inner model theory. This
represents some exceptionally sophisticated constructions with some difficult open
questions.8 The point that will be relevant for later is just that we study a wide vari-
ety of different structures on which we try and carefully control the subsets present.
Set forcing. Whilst the use of inner models seems to place constraints on the sub-
sets we take at successor stages, forcing looks to expand the subsets we have, given
some antecedently given model. More specifically, for set forcing we begin with a
partial order with domain P , ordering ≤P, and maximal element 1P, denoted by
‘P = 〈P ,≤P, 1P〉’, and have P ∈M for some ZFCmodel9 M. The relevant p ∈ P are
known as conditions and provide partial information about how objects are defined
in an extension. Using a generic filter G on P we then, via a careful choice of names
(known as ‘P-names’)10, and evaluation procedure11 add a filterG on P that intersects
all dense sets of P in M to M. The end result is a model M[G] that (i) satisfies ZFC,
(ii) has exactly the same ordinal height as M, and (iii) is strictly larger than M (in the
sense that M ⊂M[G]).12
Set forcing is historically significant in that it has been used to settle many open
questions (the most famous examples being the independence of CH and AC).
In particular we can note the following:
Theorem 7. [Cohen, 1963] If ZFC is consistent, then so is ZFC + ¬CH (and hence,
ZFC 6` CH).
The proof proceeds by taking a model of ZFC + CH (L will do), and adding κ-
many reals for someM-cardinal greater than ℵ1 (this poset is often denotedAdd(P(ω),κ)).
One can then show, by looking at properties of the partial order (namely that it has
the countable chain condition and hence it does not destroy cardinals) that the re-
sulting model (that we call M[G]) satisfies ¬CH.
The situation is in fact even more extreme. Once we have destroyed CH, we
can resurrect it again. To do this, we take a partial order Col(ω1, |P(ω)|) that will
collapse the cardinality of P(ω) back to ℵ1, restoring CH. And one can repeat the
process, turning CH off and on like a light switch. In fact, more generally:
8Current open problems are to build an L-like model for a Woodin limit of Woodin cardinals and
(assuming the Unique Branch Hypothesis) a supercompact cardinal. See [Sargsyan, 2013] for an overview.
9One does not need full ZFC, and forcing over models of weaker theories is well studied. Indeed, in
several mathematics texts (such as [Kunen, 2013]), one uses the reflection theorem to obtain a model of
‘enough’ ZFC to conduct the independence proof. We will talk a little about this strategy in §2.
10A P-name is a relation τ such that ∀〈σ, p〉 ∈ τ [“σ is a P-name” ∧p ∈ P]. In other words, τ is
a collection of ordered pairs, where the first element of each pair is a P-name and the second is some
condition in P.
11We evaluate P-names by letting the value of τ under G (written ‘val(τ ,G)’ or ‘τG’) be
{val(σ,G)|∃p ∈ G(〈σ, p〉 ∈ τ)}. The valuation operates stepwise by analysing the valuation of all the
names in τ and then either adding them to τG (if there is a p ∈ G and 〈σ, p〉 ∈ τ ) or discarding them (if
there is no such p ∈ G).
12It should be noted that in order for the forcing to be non-trivial, P has to be non-atomic (i.e. every
p ∈ P has incompatible extensions in P).
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Theorem 8. Let M be any model of ZFC. Then there areforcing extensions:13
(i) M[G], adding no new reals, such that M[G] |= CH.
(ii) M[H], collapsing no cardinals, such that M[H] |= ¬CH.
However, especially philosophically interesting is that as long as a generic is avail-
able, forcing preserves standardness. A model M is normally called standard iff it has
the real ∈-relation. When there is a generic available, the resulting forcing exten-
dion M[G] will be standard if M is.14. Thus, assuming that the ground model M
is transitive, well-founded, and satisfies ZFC, and that there is a generic G avail-
able, the forcing extension M[G] (i) has the same ordinals as M, (ii) satisfies ZFC,
and (iii) is transitive and well-founded. In this way, generic extensions of a standard
model of ZFC are also ZFC-satisfying cumulative hierarchies and look like more
legitimate models compared to models of ¬Con(ZFC), which can only be true on
an ω-nonstandard model of ZFC.
Class forcing. Class forcing is very similar to set forcing, except here we do not
insist that P is a member of M and also allow proper-class-sized partial orders that are
subclasses of M. Apart from that, things are somewhat similar; the technique also
uses partial orders with maximal elements 〈P,≤P, 1P〉, and adds a generic G to our
ground model M. Of course with class forcing, P (and hence any associated dense
classes and G) can now be proper-class-sized rather than just set-sized. There are
some additional intricacies and features, about the details of how it functions, but
we’ll suppress these for ease of reading.15
An important early application of class forcing was Easton forcing. Here we use a
proper class of conditions and the notion of Easton product to define a notion of forc-
ing coding any desired pattern (consistent with the constraints provided inZFC pro-
vided by Ko¨nig’s Theorem) into the continuum function (i.e. the function f : κ 7→ 2κ)
on regular cardinals. More precisely, we can show:
Theorem 9. (Easton)16 LetM be a transitive model ofZFC such that the Generalised
Continuum Hypothesis holds. Let F be a function that is defined on all regular
cardinals and outputs cardinal numbers such that:
1. F (κ) > κ.
2. If κ ≤ λ then F (κ) ≤ F (λ).
3. The cofinality of F (κ) is larger than κ.
Then there is an extension M[G] such that M and M[G] have the same cardinals
and cofinalities, but for every regular κ:
M[G] |= 2κ = F (κ)
13Exactly what it means to be a generic extension might need to be coded, depending on your philo-
sophical position. For example, if we take V to be starting model and you think that there is just one
universe of sets, we can’t add any G to V . We’ll see some more discussion of this in §2.
14See [Kunen, 2013], §IV.2 for verification of the basic properties of forcing.
15One option here is to force over models of the form L(A) =
⋃{L(A ∩ Vα)|α ∈ On}. Any model
(M ,A) of ZF (where we include Replacement for formulas mentioning A) can be changed to a model
of this form by expanding it to a model (M ,A∗) where A∗ = {〈0,x〉|x ∈ A} ∪ {〈1,VMα 〉|α ∈ OnM}.
Details of this presentation are available in [Friedman, 2000], Chapter 2. A second (more recent) option is
to proceed directly in a second-order set theory. See [Antos, 2018] for explanations of approaches of this
method.
16See here [Jech, 2002] pp. 232–237.
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Class forcing has some interesting properties when contrasted with standard set
forcing. For example, there are reals we can construct using class forcing that cannot
be added by set forcing.17 Further, class forcing can violate ZFC. Consider the
partially ordered class Col(ω,On) (i.e. functions p from finite subsets of ω into On
ordered by reverse inclusion). This is perfectly legitimate as class forcing partial
order. But forcing using it constructs a model M[G] that: (i) satisfies ZFC as long as
G is not allowed as a class predicate, as the first-order domains of M and M[G] are
identical18, and (ii) if we admit G as a predicate into the language Replacement fails
since G codes a cofinal sequence from ω to OnM[G].19 If we wish to restrict to class
partial orders that preserve ZFC Replacment and Power set, we have to consider
partial orders that are pretame and tame respectively.20
Hyperclass forcing. As it turns out, we can go even further. Recently [Antos and
Friedman, 2017] showed that one can define forcing that takes classes as the condi-
tions, and so the forcing partial order is a hyperclass (i.e. a collection of classes). This
is done by starting with a β-model of a strengthening of Morse-Kelley class theory,21
before coding a height extension of M (with a largest cardinal) denoted by M∗ and
performing a definable class forcing there. Whilst the implications for independence
results are not yet clear, there are reals that can be added via hyperclass forcing that
are not class generic.22
1.3 Proving theorems with extensions
In the last subsection we talked about three different but related techniques for
adding subclasses and/or subsets to models, set forcing, class forcing, and hyperclass
forcing. The kinds of results we discussed there largely pertained to independence re-
sults; we want to show that for some extensionT of ZFC and some sentence φ of set
theory φ, T 6` phi and T 6` ¬φ. The way forcing allows you to do this is by building
models that showed the consistency of T with φ (or ¬φ) given some antecedently
accepted consistency statement.
In the next two subsections we’ll see that extensions are not just used to build
models for witnessing number-theoretic consistency sentences. Rather, situating a
universe within a framework of extensions can also be useful for proving theorems
(§1.3) and formulating axioms (§1.4) about infinite sets.
17This is a very important result of Jensen, see [Friedman, 2010], p. 559 for details.
18To see this, note that for any P-name σ for this poset and for each condition p in the inter-
section of the transitive closure of σ with P, ran(p) ⊆ rank(σ). We then define the dense set
D = {p ∈ P|rank(σ) ∈ ran(p)}. D is then both dense and definable over M. Letting
σp = {τp|∃q ∈ P[τ , q ∈ σ ∧ p ≤P q]}. We then have σp = σG ∈ M whenever G is P-generic over
M and p ∈ D∩G, because p either extends or is incompatible with any condition in the transitive closure
of σ. Hence, whenever G is P-generic over M, they contain exactly the same first-order objects.
19For details, see [Holy et al., 2016].
20See [Friedman, 2000] for details.
21The relevant additional axiom is the Class Bounding principle:
∀x∃Aφ(x,A)→ ∃B∀x∃yφ(x, (B)y)
where (B)y is defined as follows:
(B)y = {z|〈y, z〉 ∈ B}.
22For the details, see [Friedman, 2000], §5.1. The rough idea is to produce a real r by hyperclass forc-
ing such that for any class A of the ground model V , the satisfaction predicate Sat(V ,A) is definable
over (V [r],A). By the Truth Lemma for class-forcing, if r were class-generic then Sat(V [r],A) would be
definable over (V [r],Sat(V ,A)) for some class A of V ; but then Sat(V [r],A) would be definable over
(V [r],A), contradicting Tarski’s Theorem.
9
Within ZFC, there are a wide number of questions concerning the universe that
can be settled on the basis of considering forcing extensions. The rough strategy
of such theorems is to show that if V has a forcing extension such that φ (for some
particular φ) then some other sentence ψ holds of V (say by using absoluteness facts).
For example:23
Theorem 10. [Baumgartner and Hajnal, 1973] ω1 −→ (α)2n for all finite n and count-
able α (i.e. For all finite n and countable α, every partition of the two-element subsets
of ω1 into a finite number of pieces has a homogeneous24 set of order-type α).
The proof proceeds by finding a homogeneous set in a forcing extension V [G]
whereMA holds. This then establishes that a certain tree from V is non-well-founded
in V [G]. We then know, by the absoluteness of well-foundedness, that the tree is also
non-well-founded in V , establishing the theorem.
The theorem is reasonably representative of how one can use the perspective of
extensions to prove facts about the ground model. One moves to an extension where
one has ensured the existence of objects of a certain desirable kind. One then uses
absoluteness facts (e.g. Le´vy-Shoenfield absoluteness) along with the objects in the
extension to show that the desired theorem holds in the ground model. Importantly
here, theorems like the above are not straightforwardly about independence (which is
naturally interpreted number-theoretically). Rather they rather concern large infini-
tary objects in the ground model. A compendium of similar theorems is available in
[Todorc˘evic´ and Farah, 1995]. A recent further proof of this kind is the [Malliaris and
Shelah, 2016] result that the two cardinal characteristics p and t are in fact equal.25.
Their proof depends crucially on supposing for contradiction that p < t in V , and
then tracing out some consequences of this assumption (and finding a contradiction)
in a forcing extension V [G].
1.4 Formulating axioms using extensions
Extensions are also useful for formulating axioms extending ZFC. In this way the
flexibility afforded by extensions often provides us with additional resources for ex-
pressing axioms with interesting properties.
Generic embeddings.26 Earlier (§1.2) we discussed large cardinals. For many large
cardinals, one way of asserting their existence is through the use of elementary em-
beddings. The cardinals measurable, strong, supercompact (among others) are all natu-
rally defined by positing the existence of elementary embeddings from V into tran-
sitive inner models. These represent strong axioms, in that they imply V 6= L. When
defining a large cardinal through an embedding j : N −→ M, the strength of the
embedding depends mainly on two parameters:27
(i) The size of N and M.
(ii) Where j sends the ordinals.
23I am grateful to Andre´s Caicedo for pointing out this example.
24Here, a homogeneous set is a subset X of ω1 such that every 2-element subset of X is in the same
member of the partition.
25I thank Jonathan Schilhan, Daniel Soukup, and Vera Fischer for discussion here.
26See here [Foreman, 2010] and [Foreman, 1986] for several key results, and [Foreman, 1998] for a more
informal overview. [Eskew, F] provides an argument against their use as axioms for settling CH.
27See here [Foreman, 2010], p. 887.
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To see some examples of how this works, consider the minimal case of such an
embedding for proper class models; namely the existence of a non-trivial j : L −→ L.
This suffices suffices to define the principle that “0] exists”.28 If we instead assume
that dom(j) = V and the target model is some transitive proper class model we ob-
tain something stronger: A measurable cardinal. A theorem of [Kunen, 1971] shows
that the existence of a non-trivial j : V −→ V is inconsistent with ZFC, and so
there are some limits (within ZFC) for what can be defined this way.29 Intermediate
cardinals are obtained by modifying the properties of j and M. For example, the fol-
lowing definition combines the dimensions (i) and (ii) to obtain something stronger:
Definition 11. A cardinal κ is λ-supercompact iff it is the critical point of a non-trivial
elementary embeddings j : V −→ M, such that j(κ) > λ and λM ⊆ M (i.e. M is
closed under λ-sequences).
The definition of λ-supercompactness postulates (i) a higher degree of similarity
between V and M (in terms of closure under λ-sequences for the relevant λ), and (ii)
stipulates that j sends κ above λ.
Given a forcing construction adding a generic G over a model N, there is the
possibility of considering generic embeddings j : N −→M ⊆ N[G]. In other words, we
begin to study embeddings from structures to inner models of their forcing extensions,
and the embedding lives in the forcing extension.
These kinds of embeddings represent new possibilities for studying large cardi-
nal like properties. Moreover, they provide a third parameter in which we can vary
the strength of the relevant cardinal to be defined:
(iii) The nature of the forcing required to define j.30
Especially interesting here is also the fact that the critical points of these embed-
dings can be quite small (even ω1 is possible), despite their strength.31 Thus, these
embeddings provide significant combinatorial power whilst facilitating proof con-
cerning small uncountable sets. In this way, they provide a kind of information that
the normal variety of large cardinal defined through an embedding cannot; the crit-
icial points of usual embeddings are always at least inaccessible.32
Whilst this has received slightly less attention in the literature, we can use class
forcing to define generic embeddings. In particular, by using class-sized stationary
tower forcing (on the assumption that V satisfies large cardinal properties), we can
define generic embeddings. An example: Suppose that V contains a proper class of
completely Jo´nsson cardinals. Letting P∞ be the class tower forcing, and G ⊂ P∞ be
V -generic, and V [G] be:
V [G] =
⋃
α∈Ord
L(Vα,G ∩ Vα)
28For details of 0], see [Jech, 2002], Ch. 18.
29See [Schindler, 2014], Theorem 4.53 for an updated proof using the Solovay Splitting Lemma.
30For further exposition of this line of thinking, see [Foreman, 1998] and [Foreman, 2010].
31For example, the existence of both a saturated ideal on ω1 (and associated generic embedding) and a
measurable cardinal implies the existence of an inner model with a Woodin cardinal, whereas the consis-
tency strength of a measurable cardinal is far below that of a single Woodin. See [Steel, 1996] for details.
32For example, concerning accessible cardinals and generic embeddings, Foreman writes:
The advantage of allowing the embeddings to be generic is that the critical points of the
embeddings can be quite small, even as small as ω1. For this reason they have many conse-
quences for accessible cardinals, settling many classical questions of set theory. ([Foreman,
2010], p887)
.
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there exists a generic embedding j : V −→ V [G] such that for every a ∈ P∞,
a ∈ G iff j[∪a] ∈ j(a).33
Virtual large cardinals.34 Another recent development has been the study of virtual
large cardinals. These cardinals are defined by postulating that a particular ordinal
or initial segment of V has a certain large cardinal property in an extension of V
as opposed to within V . In this vein, work has been done studying the notions of
virtually supercompact, virtually strongly compact, virtually strong, virtually Woodin, and
virtually extendible. As it turns out, the inconsistency of having a j : V → V does not
hold for virtual embeddings, and so one can even have a notion of virtually rank-into-
rank.
Let us look at an example:
Definition 12. [Schindler, 2000] A cardinal κ is remarkable iff in theCol(ω,<κ) forcing
extension V [G], for every regular λ > κ there is a cardinal λ0 < κ, λ0 regular in V ,
and j : HVλ0 −→ HVλ such that crit(j) = γ and j(γ) = κ.
Remarkability of κ is thus a property that concerns the embeddings that exist in
the extension if we collapse all cardinals less than κ to ω. In this way, by studying
how sets behave in the extension, we are able to ascribe large cardinal properties to
ordinals in V . The definition turns out to be a characterisation of the notion of virtual
supercompactness35. The consistency strength of a remarkable cardinal lies between
a 1-iterable and 2-iterable cardinal. While not strong enough to push us outside
V = L, it is substantially stronger than a weakly compact cardinal36. All known vir-
tual large cardinals are consistent with V = L, and many have substantial strength.
This feature makes them useful for studying the hierarchy of large cardinals between
ineffability and 0].
Absoluteness principles. The next kind of way we can formulate axioms using
extensions is as absoluteness principles. These state that certain principles that hold in
extensions are already true in an appropriate context in V .
One way absoluteness principles are useful is in providing equivalent character-
isations of forcing axioms. For example, Bagaria characterises Martin’s Axiom (MA)
and the Bounded Proper Forcing Axiom (BPFA) as follows:
Definition 13. [Bagaria, 1997] Absolute-MA. We say that V satisfies Absolute-MA iff
whenever V [G] is a generic extension of V by a partial order P with the countable
chain condition in V , and φ(x) is a Σ1(P(ω1)) formula (i.e. a first-order formula
containing only parameters from P(ω1)), if V [G] |= ∃xφ(x) then there is a y in V
such that φ(y).
Definition 14. [Bagaria, 2000] Absolute-BPFA. We say that V satisfies Absolute-BPFA
iff whenever φ is a Σ1 sentence with parameters from H(ω2), if φ holds a forcing
extension V [G] obtained by proper forcing, then φ holds in V .
33I thank Monroe Eskew for bringing this example to my attention. The details can be found in [Larson,
2004], §2.3, p. 59.
34An excellent survey of the recent developments in virtual large cardinals mentioned here is available
in [Gitman and Schindler, 2018]. Two particular uses of these cardinals are to study Silver indiscernibles in
L and index the consistency strength of other kinds of virtual axioms. In fact, we could have spoken for
longer about different kinds of virtual principle, such as virtual forcing axioms, but considerations of space
prevent a presentation of the full picture.
35See [Gitman and Schindler, 2018], p. 2.
36Weakly compact cardinals are so named in virtue of being characterisable through compactness prop-
erties on infinitary languages. They admit of a diverse number of equivalent characterisations. For details,
see [Kanamori, 2009], p. 37.
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These formulations make it perspicuous how some forcing axioms respond to
the intuition of maximising the universe under ‘possibly forceable’ sets; if we could
force there to be a set of kind φ (for a particular kind of φ and P), one already exists
in V .37
Absoluteness characterisations of forcing axioms depend upon a careful calibra-
tion between the kinds of parameters, dense sets, and partial orders considered. For
example, if one allows ω1 as a parameter and arbitrary set forcings, one immediately
obtains a contradiction with ZFC by collapsing ω1 in V . A move to considering
arbitrary extensions has been considered recently by Friedman. He considers the
following:
Definition 15. ([Friedman, 2006]) The Inner Model Hypothesis. Let φ be a parameter-
free first-order sentence. By an outer model of a model M, we mean a model O satis-
fying ZFCwith the same ordinals as M, and such that M ⊆ O. Then the Inner Model
Hypothesis for M states that if φ is true in an inner model of an outer model of M,
then φ is already true in an inner model of M.
An interesting feature of this axiom is the consequences it has for large cardinals.
On the one hand it implies that there are no inaccessible cardinals in V . On the other
hand, it implies that there are measurable cardinals in inner models of arbitrarily
large Mitchell order, and is consistent relative to the theory ZFC + PD. In this way
it presents a somewhat different perspective on the nature of set theory, on which
large cardinals are consistent but false.
The Inner Model Hypothesis, as proposed by [Friedman, 2006], is meant to apply
to arbitrary width extensions (i.e. models with the same ordinals but more subsets)
of a model, as well as arbitrary inner models. It is therefore often stated using higher-
order resources as concerned with countable transitive models M = (M ,∈, CM) in
some ambient universe (possibly V ), where quantification overM and its outer mod-
els is uncontroversial. Recently, however, Antos, Barton, and Friedman showed that
by using infinitary logics to code satisfaction in outer models, and coding the infini-
tary logic using using proper-class-sized trees, one can formulate versions of the full
IMH in a variant ofMK. We’ll talk more about these kinds of coding later (see §2.3).38
]-generation. A further use of extensions is in stating reflection properties of uni-
verses. Useful here is the notion of ]-generation. Before we begin, we need the fol-
lowing definition on the kinds of iterations we can perform along class well-orders:
Definition 16. (NBG) Let ETR (for ‘Elementary Transfinite Recursion’) be the state-
ment that every first-order recursive definition along any well-founded binary class
relation has a solution.39
Given ETRwe are guaranteed the ability to construct recursions along class well-
orders present in a model of NBG. We can then define the notion of a structure
being generated by a sharp with a particular kind of iteration:
Definition 17. (NBG + ETR)40 A transitive structure N = (N ,U) is called a class-
iterable sharp with critical point κ or just a class-iterable sharp iff:
37Some authors (e.g. [Bagaria, 2005]) see this fact as evidence for the claim that such axioms are natural
in virtue of their making precise a notion of maximality.
38There are also restricted forms of the IMH that one can consider (for example as restricted to set-
forcing extensions or tame class forcing extensions. For some philosophical discussion of these variants,
see [Barton, 2019a].
39For discussions of ETR, see [Fujimoto, 2012] and [Gitman and Hamkins, 2017].
40This way of defining sharps is modified from the discussion in [Friedman, 2016] and [Friedman and
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(i) N is a transitive model of ZFC− (i.e. ZFCwith the power set axiom removed)
in which κ is the largest cardinal and is strongly inaccessible.
(ii) (N ,U) is amenable (i.e. x ∩ U ∈ N for any x ∈ N ).
(iii) U is a normal measure on κ in (N ,U).
(iv) N is iterable in the sense that all successive ultrapower iterations along class
well-orders (over the ambient model containing the sharp) starting with (N ,U)
are well-founded, providing a sequence of structures (Ni,Ui) (for i a set or class
well-order) and corresponding Σ1-elementary iteration maps pii,j : Ni −→ Nj
where (N ,U) = (N0,U0).
Using the existence of the maps pii,j : Ni −→ Nj , we can then provide the follow-
ing definition:
Definition 18. (NBG + ETR) A transitive model M = (M ,∈) is class iterably sharp
generated iff there is a class-iterable sharp (N ,U) and an iterationN0 −→ N1 −→ N2...
such that M =
⋃
β∈OnM V
Nβ
κβ .
In other words, a model is class iterably sharp generated iff it arises through
collecting together the V Niκi (i.e. each level indexed by the largest cardinal of the
model with index i) resulting from the iteration of a class-iterable sharp through the
ordinal height of M.
A model’s being class iterably allows us to capture reflection properties of the
model. In particular, it implies that any satisfaction (possibly with parameters drawn
from M) obtainable in height extensions of M adding ordinals (through the well-
orders in the class theory of the ambient universe) is already reflected to an initial
segment of M.41 In this way, we are able to coalesce many reflection principles into
a single property of a model. For example a model M being class iterably sharp gen-
erated already entails reflection from M to initial segments of nth-order logic for any
n.42 Claiming that a model is ]-generated seems to refer to sets outside that model.
In particular, the sharp generating V has to be outside.43 An especially interesting
feature of sharps is that they cannot be reached by known forcing constructions.44
They thus present an interesting way of using extensions that cannot be captured by
forcing using current technology.
2 Universism: The most natural interpretation?
We now have several features of set theory before us:
(1.) There are issues of paradoxes besetting naive set theory.
Honzik, 2016]. This work defined sharps in terms of ‘all’ successive ultrapowers being well-founded
in a framework where any universe can be extended in height. Since philosophically relevant here is
looking at how these sorts of axioms interact with the view that there is just one universe of sets, we will
only allow the iteration of the ultrapower along any class well-order, and hence make the definitions in
NBG+ ETR.
41See [Friedman, 2016] and [Friedman and Honzik, 2016] for discussion.
42See here [Friedman and Honzik, 2016] and [Friedman, 2016].
43If the sharp were in V , one could obtain a class club resulting from iterating the sharp (namely the
class of κi), which in turn forms a club of regular V -cardinals. The ωth element of any club of ordinals with
proper initial segments in V must be singular with cofinality ω, and so we would obtain a contradiction
at κω ; it would have to be both regular and singular.
44See [Friedman, 2000], §5.2 for details.
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(2.) The Iterative Conception of Set provides us with a putative solution to these
paradoxes by viewing sets as formed in stages.
(3.) Independence is both widespread and splits into (at least) two different kinds:
Orey sentences (e.g. CH) that neither the addition of the statement nor the ad-
dition of its negation increase consistency strength, and axioms that do increase
consistency strength (e.g. Con(ZFC) or large cardinal axioms).
(4.) We can prove theorems about uncountable sets within ZFC using extensions of
universes.
(5.) We can use extensions to formulate new axioms extending ZFC.
The first philosophical position we shall consider is the following:
Universism. There is (up to isomorphism) just one maximal unique universe
of set theory, and it contains all the sets. Every set-theoretic sentence has a
definite truth value in this universe.
In this section, we’ll mainly consider how Universism responds to these factors.
But first, let’s quickly review two arguments in its favour.
2.1 Arguments for Universism
Naturality. The first ‘argument’ is just the flat observation that Universism seems
natural without arguments to the contrary. After all, doesn’t the iterative concep-
tion just tell us to take all sets at successor stages and then iterate this construction
through all the ordinals? Doesn’t such a process just define an absolute Universe for
us? Go¨del, in the second (1964) version of his paper on the Continuum Hypothesis,
writes:
“It is to be noted, however, that on the basis of the point of view here
adopted, a proof of the undecidability of Cantor’s conjecture from the
accepted axioms of set theory (in contradistinction, e.g., to the proof of
the transcendency of pi) would by no means solve the problem. For if the
meanings of the primitive terms of set theory ... are accepted as sound,
it follows that the set-theoretical concepts and theorems describe some
well-determined reality, in which Cantor’s conjecture must either be true
or false. Hence its undecidability from the axioms being assumed today
can only mean that these axioms do not contain a complete description
of that reality. ([Go¨del, 1964], p. 260)
Whilst Go¨del’s intuition that the axioms of set theory describe some well-determined
reality is shared by many philosophers and mathematicians, it will (of course) be
wholly unconvincing to anyone who doubts Universism. This highlights a common
theme debates concerning ‘the’ universe of sets: Many of the arguments and intu-
itions provided are only convincing given that you already hold the view in question.
Categoricity arguments. A second line of argument is to use some version of a cat-
egoricity argument to show that there is a restricted class of structures that conform
to our concept of set.
The first kind of categoricity argument is a semantic categoricity argument. (Se-
mantic, because it will involve the comparison of models, rather than a proof-theoretic
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approach using second-order logic that we examine below.) This was originally put
forward by Zermelo (in [Zermelo, 1930]), and developed by [Shepherdson, 1951],
[Shepherdson, 1952], and [Shepherdson, 1953], but a version was proposed (and put
to philosophical application) more recently in [Martin, 2001]. The key theorem is:
Theorem 19. (The Quasi-Categoricity Theorem) Let M and N be models of ZFC2 with
the full semantics for the second-order variables. Then either:
1. M and N are isomorphic.
2. M is isomorphic to proper initial segment of N, of the form Vκ for inaccessible
κ.
3. N is isomorphic to proper initial segment of M, of the form Vκ for inaccessible
κ.
There are a couple of different ways of presenting the proof which we shall not
go into here.45
A different approach to categoricity is internal, and has been developed recently
by [Va¨a¨na¨nen and Wang, 2015] and [Button and Walsh, 2018]. These proceed proof-
theoretically in impredicative second-order logic. The core point is that within the
set theory T we wish to show is categorical (say ZFC2) we can write out a second-
order formula StructureT(D,E) asserting that domainD and binary relation E onD
satisfy the axioms of T. Given appropriate T (the impredicative second-order ver-
sions of ZFC or Scott-Potter set theory SP suffice), one can prove that given D1,E1
and D2,E2 for which StructureT(Di,Ei) holds, either D1 and E1 are isomorphic to a
proper initial segment of D2 and E2 (where isomorphism is cashed out as a particu-
lar second-order sentence holding) or vice versa. Moreover, ifD1 andE1 andD2 and
E2 agree on what ordinals there are, then they are isomorphic. This way of proving
categoricity does not appeal to the kinds of semantics involved (that the semantics is
full), but rather pertain to what can be proved in our second-order theories.46
The thrust of the argument is then as follows: By the categoricity arguments, our
canonical theory of sets (namely ZFC2) determines the structure of the sets up to
any ordinal α. Thus, one might think, the categoricity arguments lend support to
the claim that there is just one universe of sets; given the ability to quantify over all
ordinals, we can be confident (so the Universist argues) that we have picked out a
unique structure with our reasoning.
2.2 Universist responses to the paradoxes and the iterative concep-
tion
We will see some responses to these Universist arguments in the §3, and leave so
exploration until then. For now let’s examine how the features of our set-theoretic
reasoning outlined in §1 can be interpreted by a Universist.
We’ll start with how the Universist responds to the paradoxes and interprets the
iterative conception of set.
45See [Button and Walsh, 2018], §8A for a modern presentation of a proof. A slightly different ver-
sion (given in [Martin, 2001]) proceeds stepwise by comparing different levels of the hierarchy. In fact,
full ZFC2 is not necessary for quasi-categoricity, Scott-Potter set theory is enough to guarantee quasi-
categoricity between stages, just not necessarily ones of inaccessible rank (see here [Button and Walsh,
2018], §8.5 and §8.C).
46See [Button and Walsh, 2018] (Ch. 11) for an overview of the internal categoricity results, and connec-
tions between these and the results of [McGee, 1997] and [Martin, 2001]. I am grateful to Chris Scambler
for some helpful discussion here.
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For the Universist, description of sets being formed in stages is metaphorical, and
simply refers to how the universe can be structured. There is no non-metaphorical
sense of sets being ‘formed’ in stages, rather we have the theorem that every set
belongs to some Vα, and for any particular Vα there are sets not in Vα. The iterative
conception is seen as describing an abstract structure of sets that stands free of any
literal process of formation.
In this framework we do not have sets for the problematic conditions “x 6∈ x”,
“x = x”, and “x is an ordinal”, since the structure of the Vα prohibits formation of all
sets of this kind at any point in V . However, it seems like I can make claims about
these classes that are not sets (so-called ‘proper classes’), e.g.
“The Universal class is the same class as the Russell class.”
Since we know that every set is non-self-membered under the iterative concep-
tion, and assuming an extensionality principle for classes, this claim looks true.
More interestingly, it seems like set-theoretic practice is laden with the use of
proper classes.47 For example, using the notion of embedding, we can define the no-
tion of measurable cardinal as follows:
Definition 20. An uncountable cardinal κ is measurable iff it is the critical point of
a non-trivial elementary embedding j : V → M for some transitive inner model
M |= ZFC.
In this definition, both V and M are proper classes, and if we code j by ordered
pairs, then it is too. A whole hierarchy of cardinals are definable in this way, and
proper-class-sized elementary embeddings provide one of the natural contexts in
which to talk about them.
There is then a puzzle here: We are able to make seemingly true claims about
proper classes that are useful in our set-theoretic practice.48 One might thus think
that the Universist is under some pressure to interpret talk of proper classes. There
are several options here, and we lack the space to go into full details. Nonetheless,
since the interpretation of proper classes is philosophically open and leads to some
interesting mathematical problems, we will survey a few options and challenges
here.
The standard approach is to regard talk of proper classes as shorthand for some
formula or other holding of particular sets. Instead of countenancing class talk as
legitimate in its own right, we might try to paraphrase the class talk through the use
of the relevant φ that define the classes. Hamkins, for example, says the following:
One traditional approach to classes in set theory, working purely in ZFC,
is to understand all talk of classes as a substitute for the first-order defi-
nitions that might define them... ([Hamkins, 2012], p1873)
To take some simple examples, we can paraphrase “x ∈ R”, “x ∈ V ”, and
“x ∈ On”, as “x is non-self-membered”, “x is a set”, and “x is an ordinal” re-
spectively. Similarly, if we wish to state that V = R, we can do by stating that
“∀x(x = x↔ x 6∈ x)”.
Interestingly, we can provide first-order definitions for more complicated kinds
of class. For example, let j : V −→M be an embedding witnessing the measurability
47I am enormously grateful to Sam Roberts for several helpful discussions concerning the role of classes
and embeddings.
48The usefulness of proper classes is perhaps interesting for scholars working in the tradition of Penelope
Maddy, who regard the fruitfulness of the introduction of entities as important for their acceptance (see
[Maddy, 2011]). A full analysis is outside the scope of this paper, but it merits further consideration.
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of an uncountable cardinal κ. We can (using a parameter U for a κ-complete non-
principal ultrafilter on κ) define a first-order formula φ(x, y, z) such that j(x) = y iff
φ(x, y,U) holds in V . Then, one can show:
(1) φ(x, y,U) relates every x to at most one y (i.e. φ(x, y,U) is function-
like).
(2) φ(x, y,U) relates no two x to the same y (i.e. φ(x, y,U) is one-to-one).
(3) φ(x, y,U) relates every set in V to a set in M (i.e. φ(x, y,U) is total
on V ).
(4) There is at least one x and y such that φ(x, y,U) and x 6= y (i.e.
φ(x, y,U) is non-trivial).
(5) For any x0, ...,xn and y0, ..., yn if φ(xn, yn,U) holds for both sequences
then for any parameter-free first-order formula ψ(z0, ...zn):
ψ(x0, ...,xn)↔ ψ(y0, ..., yn)
(i.e. φ(x, y,U) preserves first-order truth).49
(6) There is an ordinal x (namely κ) such that φ(x, y,U) and y is an
ordinal greater than x (i.e. φ(x, y,U) identifies the critical point of
j).
All this can be shown in a first-order fashion50. We can thus use the relation
φ(x, y,U) to do the work of the prima facie second-order entity j, whilst only talk-
ing about sets. The above formula effectively moves through the hierarchy of sets
relating the sets in V and M, identifying a critical point along the way, without ever
talking about actual proper classes.
However, there are questions surrounding the interpretation of all classes as de-
finable, and plausibly reasons to think that a Universist might want to countenance
talk of non-definable classes. Several areas of set-theoretic research seem, without
further re-interpretation, to commit us to such classes. Reflection principles are just
one such area. A reflection principle is of the following general form:
∃α(φ→ φVα)
In other words, if φ is true then φ is satisfied by some initial segment Vα (with
quantifiers and parameters restricted to Vα). A salient fact is that often Universists
consider reflection properties that are given by second-order parameters over V , and
use the principles to study small large cardinals. For example, the second-order
reflection principle states that, for any second-order parameter A over V :
(V ,∈,A) |= φ→ (Vα,∈,A ∩ Vα) |= φVα
Such a principle is most naturally understood when quantification and the pa-
rameter A are able to refer to non-first-order definable parameters over V , and pro-
duces many orders of large cardinals consistent with V = L. Without the use of
such non-definable classes, we lose interpretation of the relevant A, and hence lose
the consequences we would like within V (such as, in the case of second-order re-
flection, inaccessibles and Mahlo cardinals). Rather the kinds of cardinal we get are
49As this holds for any first-order formula ψ, this will be a schema of theorems.
50See [Suzuki, 1999] and a very clear exposition in [Hamkins, 2012] for the full technical details.
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merely definable shadows of their full second-order relatives (e.g. definably inac-
cessible, definably Mahlo etc.). Moreover, second-order reflection as it is normally
understood actually reverses to the truth of full impredicative comprehension in the
class theory. To see this, note that if any instance of impredicative compehension fails
in the class theory of V , then (by the second-order reflection principle) there must be
a Vα for which impredicative comprehension fails. However, this is impossible: since
the restricted second-order variables are interpreted as restricted to subsets of Vα (i.e.
as ranging over Vα+1), the truth of impredicative comprehension in the second-order
theory of Vα is guaranteed by the strength of the Power Set Axiom.51
Further, the study of large cardinal embeddings also raises questions for the para-
phrase of class talk in terms of definable classes. As noted earlier, we can characterise
a measurable cardinal as the critical point of a non-trivial elementary embedding j
from V to some transitive inner model M. We could also characterise this embed-
ding using a parameter for an ultrafilter U and a first-order formula φ(x, y,U). A
natural question is whether or not this method makes good sense of all theorems
concerning embeddings.
There are reasons to think that the definable formula interpretation does not. We
mention two such theorems, one negative and one positive. We deal with the nega-
tive first:
Theorem 21. [Kunen, 1971] There is no non-trivial elementary embedding j : V −→ V .
Kunen’s Theorem is relatively involved. It was conjectured by Reinhardt that
there could be such an embedding, and took roughly a year to solve.52 Moreover,
the theorem built on other results in infinitary combinatorics (such as [Erdo˝s and
Hajnal, 1966]). Recent presentations use a result of Solovay that any stationary set S
on a regular cardinal κ can be partitioned into κ-many stationary sets, and although
they substantially simplify the proof53 the result remains non-trivial. Contrast this
with the result for first-order definable elementary embeddings:
Theorem 22. [Suzuki, 1999] There is no non-trivial elementary embedding j : V −→ V
definable from parameters.
Proof. (Sketch) This result is far simpler than any proof of Kunen’s Theorem. Con-
sider a j with κ = crit(j). Let φ(x, y) define j (we suppress any parameters). We
know that since φ is first-order, then we can define a first-order formula ψ(x) that
holds iff x is the least ordinal moved by j. Since ψ(κ), by the elementarity of j we
have that ψ(j(κ)) in the target model. But since dom(j) = V and ran(j) = V , we
have that V |= ψ(κ), V |= j(κ) > κ, and V |= ψ(j(κ)). Hence κ both is and is not the
least ordinal moved by j, ⊥.54
The proof does not require any deep analysis of the nature of sets to prove. All
we do is follow through the consequences of j being first-order definable and make
some elementary observations about the nature of j in terms of its domain and range.
Thus there seems to be some discord between the claim that all embeddings are first-
order definable and the complexity involved in Kunen’s Theorem. On the subject of
Kunen’s Theorem and the definability of j, Hamkins says the following:
51I am grateful to Sam Roberts for this observation.
52The timings are somewhat hard to determine in virtue of the fact that [Solovay et al., 1978] was ‘about’
to be published from 1970 at the latest (Kunen himself mentions Reinhardt and cites the paper in [Kunen,
1971]). The philosophically relevant point still stands; the possibility of a j : V −→ V was conjectured,
relatively well-known, and took some time to refute.
53See [Schindler, 2014] for exposition.
54For full thoroughness (including checking that the notion of elementary embedding can be formalised
in a first-order theory), see [Suzuki, 1999].
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“Our view is that this way of understanding the Kunen inconsistency
does not convey the full power of the theorem. Part of our reason for this
view is that if one is concerned only with such definable embeddings
j in the Kunen inconsistency, then in fact there is a far easier proof of
the result, simpler than any of the traditional proofs of it and making
no appeal to any infinite combinatorics or indeed even to the axiom of
choice.” ([Hamkins et al., 2012], p1873)
There are several points to note here. First, it is simply a fact that many set
theorists are interested in the possibility of non-definable elementary embeddings,
lending the meaningfulness of such talk second philosophical weight. Second, the
view that all elementary embeddings are first-order definable substantially trivialises
Kunen’s Theorem, in that it makes his result relatively easy when it appears to con-
cern deep facts about the combinatorial nature of the sets. Third, definability is
unaffected by whether or not the Axiom of Choice holds. Kunen’s Theorem (and
subsequent modifications) depends essentially on use of the Axiom of Choice. Cur-
rently, it is regarded as an open question whether or not there could be a non-trivial
elementary embedding j : V −→ V if AC turns out to be false in V (or indeed in
any proper-class-sized model of ZF where AC fails). Regarding all embeddings as
first-order definable would immediately answer this question: since there can be no
definable embedding with or without AC, there is no embedding in the particular
case where AC is false.55
It is not just with respect to negative theorems concerning the non-existence of
elementary embeddings that we see this problem, however. Prima facie, set theo-
rists talk about the existence of embeddings that cannot be first-order definable. The
following is a good example:
Theorem 23. [Vickers and Welch, 2001] Suppose I ⊆ On witnesses that the ordinals
are Ramsey56. Then, definably over (V ,∈, I), there is a transitive model M = (M ,∈),
and an elementary embedding j : (M ,∈) −→ (V ,∈) with a critical point.
Here, I is a proper class of good indiscernibles forOn. If we introduce a predicate
‘I(x)’ into the language to talk about those indiscernibles (so I(x) holds iff x ∈ I), we
can define (using I(x)) a non-trivial elementary embedding from M to V . However,
we should also be mindful of the following result:
Theorem 24. [Suzuki, 1999] Let j : M −→ V be a definable elementary embedding
such that M is transitive and On ⊂M. Then j has no critical point.
By this theorem, the Vickers-Welch embedding cannot be first-order definable
over V . However, it seems that we are able to talk about such an embedding in
55I am grateful to Sam Roberts for emphasising the importance of triviality and the settling of open
questions to me, and also for pointing out Kunen’s Theorem as a place where these issues arise.
56The details of Ramsey properties are somewhat technical and inessential for seeing the philosophical
issues, and so we relegate them to a footnote:
To define Ramseyness, we first need the notion of a good set of indiscernibles. Let I ⊆ A = Lκ[A,∈, ~B, ...]
be a first-order structure. Then I is a good set of indiscernibles for A if for any γ ∈ I :
(i) A =df Lγ [A  γ,∈, ~B  γ, ...] ≺ A,
(ii) I\γ is a set of indiscernibles for 〈A, 〈ζ〉ζ<γ〉
We then say that κ is Ramsey iff any first-order structure with κ ⊆ |A| has a good set of indiscernibles
of length κ. To define Ramseyness for the particular case of the proper class On (the previous definitions
only apply to set-sized structures). We say that On is Ramsey iff there is a class I ⊆ On, unbounded, of
good indiscernibles for (V ,∈). More details and uses of these definitions are available in [Vickers and
Welch, 2001].
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a perfectly rigorous manner. It is not just j that cannot be definable in the above
theorem. I cannot be definable as one can define a satisfaction relation for (V ,∈)
over (V ,∈, I).57 One might thus think that insisting on all classes being first-order
definable prohibits an area of study that may produce fruitful mathematics with
consequences for V .
Given an acceptance of the use of non-definable classes, one substantial question
is how we should interpret talk concerning them. One option is simply to regard
all talk about non-definable classes as simply implicitly restricted to some Vκ where
non-definable classes for Vκ are uncontroversially available in P(Vκ). If, however,
one wishes to have “V ” denoting V in the relevant theorems, we need a more subtle
interpretation. This seems like no easy task, as Penelope Maddy identifies:
The problem is that when proper classes are combinatorially determined
just as sets are, it becomes very difficult to say why this layer of proper
classes on top of V is not just another stage of sets we forgot to include.
It looks like just another rank; saying it is not seems arbitrary. The only
difference we can point to is that the proper classes are banned from set
membership, but so is the κth rank banned from membership in sets of
rank less than κ. ([Maddy, 1983], p. 122)
Many accounts that seek to provide an interpretation of non-definable class talk
thus attempt to provide a way of justifying but reconciling the following two desider-
ata (that seem to be in tension):
(1.) We should be able to interpret talk about non-definable classes for the Univer-
sist.
(2.) We should make clear how our interpretation of non-definable classes makes
them different from sets, and why classes cannot be members of sets (or if they
can be, why this isn’t problematic).
Several accounts have been advanced in the literature. One could interpret classes
using properties (one could extract such an account from [Linnebo, 2006]) or Fregean
concepts ([Linnebo, 2010]). Another option is to interpret the classes as possible
predicates (this direction is suggested by [Parsons, 1974], though he is somewhat
circumspect about the possibility of interpreting lots of non-definable class talk this
way). A further methodology is to regard class talk as interpreted through plural
reference and quantification, and the impredicative class comprehension schema as
underwritten by the plural comprehension schema (see here [Uzquiano, 2003]).
A separate challenge concerning classes, one that does not depend on the non-
definability of the classes in question, is the possibility of considering well-orders
longer than all the ordinals. The following is an example (let Ω denote the length of
the ordering of all ordinals58):
57See [Vickers and Welch, 2001] for details. In the Introduction to the paper containing the above result,
Vickers and Welch say the following:
It is quite natural to study the properties of elementary embeddings j : V −→ M for M
some inner model, since many such embeddings, if they exist, have first order formulations
within ZFC. The question of reversing the arrow and looking at a non-trivial j : M −→ V
in general does not readily admit of such formulations. So we study in this paper what
might be considered the ZFC consequences of the second order statement that there are
proper classes j, M such that... ([Vickers and Welch, 2001], p. 1090)
58If this makes the reader feel metamathematically queasy, one can interpret the talk over some Vα to
see the problem in the case of V .
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α ≺Ω+1 β iff either:
(i) α ≥ 1 ∧ β ≥ 1 ∧ α < β, or
(ii) α ≥ 1 ∧ β = 0.
Such an ordering (expressible in L∈) effectively puts ∅ past the end of all the
ordinals, defining a well-order of length Ω + 1. The example can be pushed further:
α ≺Ω.2 β iff either:
(i) α is a successor and β is a limit, or
(ii) α and β are both limits and α < β, or
(iii) α and β are both successors and α < β.
Such a definition (expressible inL∈) prima facie defines an ordering of length Ω.2.
We can provide definitions of still longer well-orderings. The following defines an
ordering on ordered pairs of ordinals that is (prima facie) Ω times as long as Ω:
〈α,β〉 ≺Ω.Ω 〈γ, δ〉 iff
(i) α < γ, or
(ii) α = γ and β < δ.59
Intuitively speaking, such an ordering defines an Ω-length sequence of ordered
pairs for every ordinal. Clearly it is possible (by moving to ordered triples, quadru-
ples, etc.) to iterate the definition to ordinally multiplying Ω by itself over and over.
A puzzle then emerges; we appear to be defining orders longer than Ω, but there is
no set-theoretic representative corresponding to these order-types.60
The problem is a philosophical rather than mathematical one. It is not mathe-
matically incoherent to say that there are formulae defining well-orders longer than
Ω. It is simply that these well-orders cannot have von Neumann ordinal represen-
tatives in V (on pain of the Burali-Forti contradiction). This then raises a conceptual
problem: If we are able (prima facie) to coherently compare these long well-orders
and they have mathematical use61, then what is the underlying ontology behind the
order-types?
A substantial open philosophical question for the Universist is thus the following:
It seems that there are ways we talk mathematically about classes, and there are ways
these classes can be ordered that do not have representatives. This raises several
further questions:
59The orderings ≺Ω+1, ≺Ω.2, and ≺Ω.Ω are taken from [Shapiro and Wright, 2006].
60This issue is considered in detail by [Shapiro and Wright, 2006].
61As it turns out, there are well-orders that are mathematically useful that define orders longer than Ω.
An example is the standard ordering on mice, which is defined as follows:
Definition 25. Let JUα = Hull
JUα
n (γ ∪ p) and JU′α′ = Hull
JU
′
α′
m (γ
′ ∪ p′) be mice and λ be any suffi-
ciently large regular cardinal. Let i0,λ : JUα −→ JCλβ and i′0,λ : JU
′
α′ −→ J
Cλ
β′ be the respective iterated
ultrapowers witnessing their mice-hood. Then JUα = Hull
JUα
n (γ ∪ p) <M JU′α′ = Hull
JU
′
α′
m (γ
′ ∪ p′) iff:
(i) β < β′, or
(ii) β = β′ and γ < γ′, or
(iii) β = β′, γ = γ′, and q < q′ in the descending lexicographic ordering.
Working through the definition, we see that this would define an order-type of length Ω.3.
22
1. What theory should we use to underwrite talk of classes?
2. What philosophical interpretation of classes should we provide?
3. What constraints are there on interpretations of classes?
4. How should we think of the ontology of well-orders ‘longer than’ Ω?
Later (§3) we shall see how views that deny Universism attempt to answer these
difficult questions. For now, we move on to consideration of the options for the
Universist in interpreting the extensions we talked about in §1.
2.3 Universist interpretations of extensions
Let us move on to the question of how the Universist might interpret the various
kinds of extensions we talked about in §1. There we saw four main kinds of exten-
sions (i) set forcing extensions, (ii) class forcing extensions, (iii) hyperclass forcing
extensions, and (iv) extensions with sharps, which in turn were useful for showing
(a) independence, (b) proving theorems, and (c) formulating axioms.
Whence the problem? Well each of set, class, and hyperclass forcing, as well as
sharps (1.) appear to require sets external to the structures they concern, and (2.)
often “V ” is used to denote the relevant ground model. But if “V ” really denotes V
here, then we appear to be considering sets outside the ‘one true universe’, contrary
to the Universist’s position.
Obviously for the Universist, they require some re-interpretation of the talk (or to
claim that the discourse never claimed to discuss extensions of V in the first place).
Here we survey some extant possibilities.
An abuse of notation. One option is just to argue that use of the term “V ” is merely
an abuse of notation, and refers to any model of ZFC that can support the relevant
construction. For example, Koellner writes:
Set theorists often use ‘V ’ instead of ‘M ’ and so write ‘V [G]’. But if V
is the entire universe of sets then V [G] is an “illusion”. What are we to
make of this? Most set theorists would say that it is just an abuse of
notation. When one is proving an independence result and one invokes
a transitive model M of ZFC to form M [G] one wants to underscore the
fact that M could have been any transitive model of ZFC and to signal
that it is convenient to express the universality using a special symbol.
The special symbol chosen is ‘V ’. This symbol thus has a dual use in set
theory—it is used to denote the universe of sets and (in a given context)
it is used as a free-variable to denote any countable transitive model (of
the relevant background theory). ([Koellner, 2013], p. 19)
Koellner’s point is that we could interpret talk of “V ” as some countable transi-
tive model or other of ZFC (let’s denote it by V). There is then no problem to inter-
pret any of set-forcing, class forcing, hyperclass forcing, or sharps over V ; it can be
extended by any of these constructions in width. Moreover, Ord(V) is just some tiny
countable ordinal. We can thus perfectly well consider models M such that V ∈ VMα ,
and there are many height extensions of V in M. So there is no trouble to interpret
extensions if this is the interpretation of the use of the symbol “V ” prescribed.
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One issue of this response is the extent to which it preserves the ‘naturality’,
‘intendedness’, or ‘aboutness’ of the interpretation. If one is moved by such consid-
erations, we can generate problems for the response as follows: Such an interpreta-
tion is fine for interpreting independence results, when all we want to show is that
for some extension T of ZFC, some model of T + ¬φ exists and thus there cannot
be a proof (code) of φ within models of T. In this case, we don’t really care what
the model looks like; we’re just providing a countermodel for the claim that T ` φ.
However, when we are formulating axioms or proving theorems about objects within
V , perhaps we want a tighter connection between those objects we are predicating
a property of and the use of extensions. As an example, suppose that we predicate
the property of remarkability for some ordinal α in V . This uses extensions, and so
using the countable transitive model strategy, we interpret this as about some small
countable ordinal αV ∈ V . But then it does not seem that our talk is about α at all.62
Use of the forcing relation. Different options are available for the specific case
of forcing. Here we can let “V ” denote V , but reinterpret what is meant by talk
of ‘forcing extension’. One option is to move syntactically by defining the forcing
relation, that captures the consequences of extensions without actually committing
to the existence of any models. Roughly put, letting P = 〈P ,≤P〉 be a forcing poset,
p ∈ P , and φ be in the forcing language for P,63, we can define a relation p ∗P
recursively such that:64
(1) If φ1, ...,φn ` ψ and p ∗P φi for each i, then p ∗P ψ.
(2) p ∗P φ for every axiom of ZFC.
(3) If φ(x1, ...,xn) is a formula known to be absolute for transitive models, then for
every p and all sets a1, ..an; p ∗P φ(aˇ1, ..., aˇn) iff 1P ∗P φ(aˇ1, ..., aˇn) iff φ(a1, ..., an)
is true in V .
This relation lets us talk about what would be satisfied in the extension V [G] by
analysing what sentences conditions p ∈ P force. By (3), any theorem proved ‘in
V [G]’ will be verified by the check names and hence by specific sets in V . Similarly,
if we wish to formulate an axiom about V using a forcing extension, we can do so by
finding a p that forces the required sentence about objects in the ideal extension.
There are two main challenges to this interpretation, as far as forcing in general is
concerned. The first is an issue of scope. Whilst the interpretation does not aim to in-
terpret talk of sharps, there are still difficulties as far as class forcing is concerned, for
the simple reason that the forcing relation is not always definable when the forcing
poset is proper-class-sized.65
62See [Barton, 2019b] for further examination of this point.
63The forcing language of P is the collection of all formulas that can be formed by the usual logical
operators from the languageL∈ combined with a constant symbol for every name in V P (the P-names).
64See [Kunen, 2013] for details of the forcing relation and verification of the relevant proofs.
65For example, consider the following forcing:
Definition 26. Let M be a model for ZFC. Then the Friedman poset (denoted by ‘FM’) is a partial order
of conditions p = 〈dp, ep, fp〉 such that:
(i) dp is a finite subset of ω.
(ii) ep is a binary acyclic relation on dp.
(iii) fp is an injective function with dom(fp) ∈ {∅, dp} and ran(fp) ⊆M.
(iv) If dom(fp) = dp and i, j ∈ dp, then iepj iff fp(i) ∈ fp(j).
(v) The ordering on FM is given by:
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A second question is the extent to which such an interpretation preserves as much
‘intendedness’ of the original forcing interpretation as possible. [Barton, 2019b], for
example, argues that an alternative paraphrase is desirable since the interpretation
fails to explicitly mention models, and thus is insufficiently ‘natural’ from a forcing
perspective.
Boolean-valued models and Boolean ultrapowers. An alternative but closely re-
lated paraphrase of forcing constructions is via the use of Boolean-valued models.66
Given a forcing poset P, we can find a separative67 partial order Q, equivalent to P
for forcing, and a (unique up to isomorphism) Boolean completion of Q (denoted by
‘B(Q)’).68 We then consider the class of B(P)-names (denoted by ‘V B(P)’), assign val-
ues from B(P) to atomic relations between them, and provide an inductive definition
for the quantifiers.69
It is then routine to show that V B(P) is a Boolean-valued model of ZFC. In par-
ticular every axiom (and hence every theorem) of ZFC has Boolean-value 1B(P) in
V B(P). Moreover, for the purposes of consistency proofs, we know that if we can
assign φ a Boolean-value greater than 0B(P), then ¬φ is not a consequence of ZFC
(as if ¬φ is a consequence of ZFC, then φ receives Boolean value 0B(P)). In fact, an
assignment of a Boolean value greater than 0B(P) to φ exactly mimics the satisfaction
of φ in some V [G], for V -generic G. Thus, even if we are Universists, we might just
interpret talk of forcing and generics as about the relevant Boolean-valued models.
Again, there is a question of scope for the Boolean-valued model approach (inde-
pendently of considerations concerning sharps). The main issue is that the existence
of Boolean-completions for class-sized partial orders is not a trivial matter. The usual
way we obtain a Boolean completion is to find a separative partial order equivalent
to P for forcing (known as the separative quotient), and embed it into a Boolean al-
gebra70. Effectively, we add a bottom element and the required suprema to form
B(P).71
If one is a Universist, however, things are not so simple where class-sized partial
orders are concerned. Since the partial order is unbounded in V , one can not always
p ≤FM q ↔ dq ⊆ dp ∧ ep ∩ (dq × dq) = eq ∧ fq ⊆ fp.
This defines a proper-class-sized partial order as the individual fp include every function from some
finite subset of ω to a (sub)set of M, and hence there are proper-class-many such ordered triples (relative
to M). The partial order adds a bijection FF between ω and M , and a relation EF ∈ M[G] such that
〈ω,EF〉 and 〈M ,∈〉 are isomorphic. If the forcing relation for F were definable, M would then have
access to its own truth definition (contradicting Tarski’s Theorem). For the details of the proof, and further
discussion of the Truth and Definability lemmas in context of class forcing, see [Holy et al., 2016]. One
might instead postulate that a definition can be given for FV and other class-sized partial orders with
non-first-order definable forcing relations. Such definitions could not be first-order, but interestingly such
a hypothesis fits naturally in the space of second-order set theories between NBG and MK. [Gitman
et al., 2017] showed that the hypothesis that every class partial order has a forcing relation is equivalent
to the principle that transfinite recursions of class relations for ordinal length are legitimate (so called
‘ETROrd’).
66The Boolean-valued approach was developed by Scott and Solovay, with additional contributions by
Vopeˇnka (among others). See [Smullyan and Fitting, 1996], p. 273 for historical details and references.
67A partial order P = (P ,<P) is separative iff for all p, q ∈ P , if p 6≤P q then there exists an r ≤P p that
is incompatible with q.
68For details of Boolean algebras (from which our presentation is derived) see [Jech, 2002], Chapter 7.
A discussion of Boolean completions is available in ibid. Chapter 14.
69See here, [Jech, 2002], Ch. 14.
70More formally, for any set-sized partial order P, there is a Boolean algebra B(P) and an embedding
e : P −→ B(P)+ (where B(P)+ is the set of non-zero elements of B(P)) such that for p, q ∈ P: (i) if p ≤P q,
then e(p) ≤B(P) e(q), (ii) p and q are compatible iff e(p) ∧ e(q), and (iii) {e(p)|p ∈ P} is dense in B(P).
71For the full details, see [Jech, 2002], Chapter 14.
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assume that there will be space to add a bottom element and suprema (without com-
mitting oneself to the existence of hyperclasses). As it turns out, a class partial order
has a class Boolean-completion in a model ofMK precisely when all antichains are at
most set-sized (known as theOrd-chain condition).72 Thus, the kinds of class forcing
we can interpret using Boolean-valued models is somewhat restricted.
Further, there is again the issue of whether or not the interpretation preserves as
much as possible of the forcing idea. Though the approach is model-theoretic (rather
than syntactic as with the forcing relation), the model is not two-valued, and no
model is actually being extended when we consider what holds in a Boolean-valued
context. In this respect, we might question whether the Boolean-valued models ap-
proach is a philosophically satisfactory paraphrase for many forcing constructions.
There are, however, ways of modifying Boolean-valued models to proper-class-
sized two-valued structures via Boolean-ultrapowers and quotient structures. The
technique is studied in detail in [Hamkins and Seabold, 2012] (and plays a role in
motivating Hamkins’ view that we will discuss later). Importantly, the method pro-
vides a way of finding models internal to V that bear forcing relationships to one
another. More formally, one can prove:
Theorem 27. [Hamkins and Seabold, 2012] The Naturalist Account of Forcing. If V is
the universe of set theory and B is a notion of forcing, then there is in V a definable
class model of the theory expressing what it means to be a forcing extension of V .
Specifically, in the forcing language with ∈, constant symbols xˇ for every x ∈ V , a
predicate symbol Vˇ to represent V as a ground model, and a constant symbol G˚, the
theory asserts:
(1) The full elementary diagram of V , relativised to the predicate Vˇ , using the con-
stant symbols for elements of V .
(2) The assertion that Vˇ is a transitive proper class in the (new) universe.
(3) The assertion that G˚ is a Vˇ -generic ultrafilter on Bˇ.
(4) The assertion that the new universe is Vˇ [G˚], and ZFC holds there.
This can be done by first taking an ultrafilter U on the relevant Boolean-algebra
B (for convenience sake, we now drop the notation B(P)) and using it to build a par-
ticular ultrapower embedding jU (the so-called Boolean ultrapower map) between
V and an inner model VˇU . When we then form the quotient structure V B/U of V B
(formed by taking the standard quotient structure), we find an interesting relation-
ship between VˇU and V B/U : V B/U is precisely the forcing extension of VˇU by U . One
can verify that V B/U |= ZFC and also that if φ has Boolean-value greater than 0B in
V B, then V B/U |= φ.
Importantly, this can be done with a non-V -generic ultrafilter. Hence U can per-
fectly well be in V . In fact, when one constructs the Boolean ultrapower over some
model of set theory M = (M ,E), the claim that U is M-generic is equivalent to the
Boolean ultrapower jU being trivial (i.e. letting EU be the ‘membership’ relation de-
fined by the Boolean ultrapower, jU is an isomorphism between M and (MˇU ,EU )).
If jU is non-trivial on V , we map V to a subclass of itself (much as we do with a
measurable cardinal embedding). Since VˇU is not the whole of V when U is in V (and
hence not V -generic), it is possible for a set external to VˇU to be our generic for VˇU .
One might then use VˇU as our interpretation of “V ” and V B/U as our interpretation
of V [G]. This seems attractive, whilst VˇU is not isomorphic to V , it does nonetheless
72See [Holy et al., 2016] and [Holy et al., 2018] for the result (attributed to Hamkins).
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looks a lot like V ; it is a proper-class-sized two-valued elementary extension of V ,
and V B/U really is the forcing extension of VˇU by U .
Aside from the remaining issue of finding Boolean-completions in the class the-
ory, there are some further challenges. For instance, often VˇU is non-well-founded
(especially when the forcing in question alters the subsets of small Vα) and part of
what was interesting about forcing was that it kept the relevant models standard.
This raises questions as to whether it is a good candidate for interpreting the ‘natu-
rality’ of forcing constructions, whatever its independent mathematical interest.73
The options discussed so far only touch forcing constructions for the Universist,
and there seem to be challenges for interpreting both class forcing and hyperclass
forcing (where we may not have a definable forcing relation or a Boolean-algebra
in the class theory), or sharps (which we do not know how to obtain them through
forcing). Recently, the use of infinitary logics has found use for this application.
V -logic. It has been known since [Barwise, 1975] that infinitary logics can be used
to interpret satisfaction in outer models over a given model of set theory. This was
then used by [Antos et al., 2015] in providing an interpretation of extension talk in a
framework where height extensions are available.74 Recently [Antos et al., S] showed
how this could then be coded using impredicative class theory.
There are three main components to this strategy:
(1.) Define the relevant infinitary logic (V -logic) for coding satisfaction in outer mod-
els.
(2.) Show that this logic can be represented in Hyp(V ), the least admissible ‘set’
containing V as an element.
(3.) Code Hyp(V ) using class-theoretic machinery.
In defining the logic, we first need to set up the language:
Definition 28. L V∈ is the language consisting of ZFC with the following symbols
added:
(i) A predicate V¯ to denote V .
(ii) A constant x¯ for every x ∈ V .
We can then define V -logic:
Definition 29. V -logic is a system in L V∈ , with provability relation `V (defined be-
low) that consists of the following axioms:
(i) x¯ ∈ V¯ for every x ∈ V .
(ii) Every atomic or negated atomic sentence of L∈ ∪ {x¯|x ∈ V } true in V is an
axiom of V -logic.
73For the details and these arguments, see [Barton, 2019b]. Koellner also raises the issue:
“There are three important things to note about [V B/U ]—it need not be transitive, it need
not be well-founded, it is a definable class in V . For all three reasons it is as non-standard a
model of set theory...one sees by construction that the model produced is not of the appro-
priate type to count as the universe of sets.” ([Koellner, 2013], pp. 19–20)
74This idea is also discussed in [Antos et al., 2015], [Friedman, 2016], and [Barton and Friedman, 2017].
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(iii) The usual axioms of first-order logic inL V∈ .
For sentences inL V∈ , V -logic contains the following rules of inference:
(a) Modus ponens: From φ and φ→ ψ infer ψ.
(b) The Set-rule: For a, b ∈ V , from φ(b¯) for all b ∈ a infer ∀x ∈ a¯φ(x).
(c) The V -rule: From φ(b¯) for all b ∈ V , infer ∀x ∈ V¯ φ(x).
Proof codes in V -logic are thus (possibly infinite) well-founded trees with root
the conclusion of the proof. Whenever there is an application of the V -rule, we get
proper-class-many branches extending from a single node. Using this definition, one
can then set up a notion of proof as follows:
Definition 30. For a theoryT and sentence φ in the language of V -logic, we say that
T `V φ iff there is a proof code of φ in V -logic fromT. We furthermore say that a set
of sentences T is consistent in V -logic iff T `V φ ∧ ¬φ is false for all formulas ofL V∈ .
One can then show how the apparatus of V -logic can interpret extensions. For
example, letting Φ be a condition in any particular formal language on universes we
wish to simulate in an extension, we then introduce the following ‘axioms’ into our
theory of V -logic:
(i) W¯ -Width Axiom. W¯ is a universe satisfying ZFC with the same ordinals as V¯
and containing V¯ as a proper subclass.
(ii) W¯ -Φ-Width Axiom. W¯ is such that Φ.
We can then have the following axiom to give meaning to the notion of an exten-
sion such that Φ:
Φ`V -Axiom. The theory in V -logic with the W¯ -Width Axiom and W¯ -Φ-
Width Axiom is consistent under `V .75
One can then interpret the existence of set forcing generics by claiming that the
theory with the following axiom added is consistent:
Definition 31. W¯ -G-Width Axiom. W¯ is such that it contains some V¯ -P¯-generic G.
Similarly with class forcing, with the addition of further predicates P¯C and G¯C
for PC and GC into the usual syntax of V -logic:
Definition 32. W¯ -GC-Width Axiom. W¯ is such that G¯C ⊆ W¯ and G¯C is P¯C-generic
over V .
Importantly, this method also allows us to formulate axioms that capture non-
forcing extensions. For example:
Definition 33. W¯ -Class-]-Width Axiom. W¯ has the same ordinals as V¯ , satisfiesNBG+ETR,
and contains a class sharp that generates V .
75Strictly speaking, this will involve a new consequence relation `′V , that includes mention of any
axioms involving W¯ . In fact, any collection of additional axioms will result in a new consequence relation
involving those axioms. The consequence relation is simply `V but with any additional axioms added to
our original definition of V -logic. For clarity we suppress this detail, continue to use `V (thereby mildly
abusing notation).
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This then allows us to express the claim that V is sharp generated:
Definition 34. The Class Iterable Sharp Axiom`V . The theory in V -logic with the W¯ -
Width Axiom and W¯ -Class-]-Width Axiom is consistent under `V .
as well as the Inner Model Hypothesis:
Definition 35. IMH`V . Suppose that φ is a parameter-free first-order sentence. LetT
be a V -logic theory containing the W¯ -Width Axiom and also the W¯ -φ-Width Axiom
(i.e. W¯ satisfies φ). Then if T is consistent under `V , there is an inner model of V
satisfying φ.
In this way, if we allow the use of V -logic, we are able to syntactically code sat-
isfaction in arbitrary extensions of V in which V appears standard, and hence the
effects of extensions of V on V .
One still has to show that this can be done within the Universist framework. This
can be done by showing that (a) Hyp(V )—the least admissible set (i.e. model of
Kripke-Platek set theory) containing V—can be coded in class theory, and (b) if there
if a proof code in V -logic, then there is one in Hyp(V ). The former is accomplished
by coding sets ‘above’ V via proper-class-sized trees (since trees can code the mem-
bership relation of transitive closures), and requires Σ11-Comprehension overNBG.
The latter is lengthy but routine, so we do not include it here.76
This coding goes substantially beyond the previous examples in that it can in-
corporate all the extensions we talked about in §1. However, it bears mentioning
that the move to use of higher-order resources is significant, and Hyp(V ) cannot be
coded without the use of impredicative classes. Moreover, the coding is very syntac-
tic; it concerns how sentences and a consequence relation in infinitary logic interact.
It is not unlike the forcing relation in being syntactic, and the same worries about the
‘intendedness’ or ‘naturality’ of the interpretation transfer immediately across.
Countable transitive models: redux. A response to these kinds of problems (for
the forcing relation, Boolean-valued, and V -logic strategies) is to provide some way
of representing similar relations over countable transitive models (where extensions
are easily available), but provide enough of a link to V to justify the claim that the
interpretation is still ‘about’ the right (large) objects.77
For example, given a sufficiently rich class theory, we can show:78
Fact 36. Let φ be a sentence of V -logic with no constant symbols apart from V¯ . Then
there is a countable transitive modelV∗ such that the following are equivalent (when
every instance of V¯ is replaced by V¯∗):
(1.) φ is consistent in V -logic.
(2.) φ is consistent in V∗-logic.
(3.) V∗ has an outer model with φ true.
This is shown by using a truth predicate and the reflection theorem to reduce
the parameter-free theory of Hyp(V ) to a countable transitive model. Claims about
large infinite sets can then be rendered in a syntactic way in V -logic as about the
real sets, but with the acknowledgement that when model-theoretic reasoning about
76For the details of both, see [Antos et al., S].
77This is onsidered by [Barton, 2019a] and [Antos et al., S].
78See [Antos et al., S] use a variant ofNBG+ Σ11-Comprehension.
29
the sets occurs we have to move to a smaller countable interpretation in order to
represent the reasoning. It is an open philosophical question to what degree this is a
satisfactory move.
2.4 Universist foundational programmes
Thus far, we’ve surveyed how a Universist can respond to various kinds of chal-
lenges coming from various aspects of set theory. Responding to challenges is just
one dimension of a foundational set-theoretic view, it is also important to consider
the mathematical programmes that are naturally motivated by Universism.
Of course, if you hold Universism, then you hold that every sentence of set the-
ory has a definite truth-value. Given the independence results, a significant part of
many universist programmes is motivating the acceptance of some axiom(s) resolv-
ing independence. Whilst it would take us too far afield to go through every possible
programme in detail, there are some that should be highlighted. This list should not
therefore not be treated as exhaustive.
The Inner Model Programme. One strategy for developing new axioms and study-
ing the internal structure of V has come from the inner model programme. Here, we
consider the kinds of inner model that can be built assuming the existence of cardinal
numbers of particular kinds. For example, assuming the existence of a measurable
cardinal, we can build L[U ], an L-like (in that it satisfies GCH and the Condensation
Lemma79) model containing a measurable cardinal. Moving higher up the large car-
dinal hierarchy, we find other kinds of L-like inner model. The details become com-
plex quickly, but set theorists are currently working on constructing inner models
for many Woodin cardinals and (with additional assumptions on the kind of itera-
tion available80 at supercompact cardinals.81
Ultimate-L. Standing at the end of this road is the idea that V just is one such
model. This has been recently proposed by Woodin, who shows that if there is an
L-like inner model for a supercompact cardinal (call it Ultimate-L) then all cardinals
that exist in V are inherited by Ultimate-L. This lies in stark contrast to known L-
like inner models that are transcended by stronger large cardinal assumptions. For
example, V = L[U ] is refuted by the existence of two measurable cardinals. He then
proposes that we take V = Ultimate-L as a new axiom of set theory, seeing as it
would solve known problems of independence and could not be refuted by large
cardinal axioms.82
Forcing axioms. A very different approach is provided by proponents of so-called
forcing axioms. We mentioned absoluteness characterisations of some of these axioms
in §1. In general, however, forcing axioms assert that there are generics in V for
certain families of dense sets and kinds of partial order. A popular one such is:
79The Condensation Lemma for L[U ] (or, mutatis mutandis, any other model) states that if
M ≺ (Lδ[U ],∈,U ∩ Lδ[U ]) for limit ordinal δ, then the transitive collapse of M is Lγ [U ] for some γ ≤ δ.
80Namely the Unique Branch Hypothesis.
81For discussion here, see [Sargsyan, 2013] or [Woodin, 2017].
82The full case for Ultimate-L is somewhat more sophisticated than what I have presented here. For the
mathematical details, see [Woodin, 2017]. A concise overview of the key philosophical details is available
in [Koellner, 2019], with further background in [Koellner, 2014], [Koellner, 2011].
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Axiom 37. (The Proper Forcing Axiom or PFA) If P is a proper83 forcing poset, andD is
an ℵ1-sized family of dense sets for P, then there is a D-generic filter G intersecting
every member of D.
The idea of such an axiom is to hold that V is closed under the formation of
generics for families of dense sets for some appropriate class of forcings, and in this
way saturate the universe under as much forcing as possible. Strengthenings of PFA
are possible, for example to Martin’s Maximum (where we allow arbitrary stationary
set preserving posets instead of proper posets) and its variants84. Of course, it is not
possible to saturate the universe with generics for arbitrary families of dense sets,
such an axiom would imply (per impossibile) a V -generic filter. However, the idea
can be given intuitive content by Universist using the idea that every possible set
exists. Magidor writes the following:
“Forcing axioms like Martin’s Axiom (MA), the Proper Forcing Axiom
(PFA), Martin’s Maximum (MM) and other variations were very success-
ful in settling many independent problems. The intuitive motivation for
all of them is that the universe of sets is as rich as possible, or at the slogan
level: A set [whose] existence is possible and there is no clear obstruction
to its existence [exists]...
...What do we mean by “possible”? I think that a good approximation is
“can be forced to [exist]”...
I consider forcing axioms as an attempt to try and get a consistent ap-
proximation to the above intuitive principle by restricting the properties
we talk about and the the forcing extensions we use. ([Magidor, U], pp.
15–16)
The issue of exactly how far this intuition can take us is an open question. How-
ever, forcing axioms represent a markedly different approach to the Ultimate-L pro-
gramme, the former implies CH, whereas most forcing axioms that settle a value for
the continuum imply that 2ℵ0 = ℵ2.
Reflection principles. A final kind of axioms we will mention is reflection principles.
Many set theorists and philosophers regard these axioms as natural principles85, and
it has been argued that they represent axioms that the Universist can justify better
than her counterparts.
What exactly counts as a reflection principle is a somewhat difficult question.
Roughly, they assert that the universe cannot be distinguished (in some precise sense)
from one of its initial segments. For example we might consider the first-order re-
flection schema:
Axiom 38. (First-Order Reflection Schema) Let φ(~x) be a formula with variables ~x
and let φVβ (~x) denote the restriction of quantifiers and variables in φ(~x) to Vβ . Then
∀α∃β > α∀~x ∈ Vβ [φ(~x)↔ φVβ (~x)]
This schema is equivalent (modulo the other axioms of ZFC) to the Axiom of
Infinity and Replacement Scheme. Allowing higher-order formulae and parameters
83A forcing poset P is proper iff for every uncountable cardinal κ, every stationary subset of [κ]ω is
stationary in the generic extension.
84For variants of Martin’s Maximum, see [Viale, 2016] and [Viale, 2016].
85See, for example, [Bernays, 1961], [Reinhardt, 1974], and [Fraenkel et al., 1973].
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produces stronger and stronger reflection principles. For instance, allowing second-
order sentences to be reflected yields inaccessible cardinals. If one then asserts that
formulae are reflected to a Vκ with κ strongly inaccessible, one produces Mahlo cardi-
nals. Reflecting then to Mahlo cardinals results in α-Mahlo cardinals. One can move
to a higher-order language, thus allowing stronger and stronger reflection principles
and thereby producing a hierarchy of cardinals known as the indescribable cardi-
nals.86 However, as [Koellner, 2009] shows, all known cardinals of this form are
below the least ω-Erdo˝s cardinal.87 Generalising to third-order parameters yields a
contradiction.88
Recently, Welch has proposed a (much stronger) global reflection principle in an
effort to overcome this boundary. The principle has its conceptual roots in the reflec-
tion arguments used by Reinhardt in [Reinhardt, 1974], which in turn are somewhat
similar to the ideas at play in [Magidor, 1971]. He uses elementary embeddings to char-
acterise:
Axiom 39. (GRP) Let (V ,∈, C) denote the structure of V with all its classes. The
Global Reflection Principle states that there is a non-trivial elementary embedding89 j
and ordinal κ with crit(j) = κ such that:
j : (Vκ,∈,Vκ+1) −→ (V ,∈, C)
The GRP is very strong, implying the existence of a proper class of Woodin car-
dinals. There is a question, however, as to the extent that this is a ‘reflection’ princi-
ple, depending as it does on the j used to define the embedding. However recently
Roberts has shown that by implementing reflection with a satisfaction predicate, one
can obtain a strong reflection principle (implying the existence of 1-extendible cardi-
nals) that looks more like the traditional reflection principles.90
Interesting here is that some authors see this as a possible difference between the
Universist and her counterparts; she can motivate reflection more easily. The reason
for this is that a reflection principle asserts that the universe (or the ‘absolute’) in
some sense evades being captured. If we deny Universism and hold that there is no
absolute, the motivation seems less clear.91
Overlapping consensus. The Universist thus has several competing foundational
programmes to choose from. One question then is the extent to which they overlap.
For example, Koellner points to the fact that ADL(R) is implied by all theories that
provide a fine structure theory for Woodin cardinals.92 This includes, for example,
theories that imply the outright existence of Woodin cardinals (such as the strong
86A cardinal κ is Q-indescribable (where Q is of the form Σmn or Πmn ) iff for any X ⊂ Vκ and sentence
φ of Q order and complexity, if 〈Vκ,∈,X〉 |= φ then there is an α < κ such that 〈Vα,∈ X ∩ Vα〉 |= φ.
87The first ω-Erdo˝s cardinal is the least cardinal satisfying certain combinatorial properties on a parti-
tion into its finite subsets. As the definition of the cardinal is somewhat involved I omit it here; details are
available in a wide variety of texts including [Drake, 1974], [Kanamori, 2009], and [Jech, 2002].
88See here [Tait, 2005] or [Koellner, 2009].
89The level of elementary insisted upon results in different technical consequences: see [Welch, 2014]
for details.
90See [Roberts, 2017] and [Welch, 2019] for discussion of this issue.
91For example, Tait writes that if we deny Universism:
“...reflecting down from the universe of all sets, becomes problematic. For it seems to require
that we know what it means to say that a sentence φ(t) is true in the universe of all sets.”
([Tait, 2003], p473)
This idea is echoed by [Koellner, 2009]. However, [Tait, 2005] provides a way of obtaining reflecting
universes within an anti-Universist background, and [Barton, 2016b] argues that Welch’s motivations can
be used without holding Universism.
92See here [Koellner, 2014] (esp. §4.5) and the references contained therein.
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reflection principles considered by Roberts and Welch) but also axioms like PFA.93
These results seem to suggest that there might be certain levels of the hierarchy that
can be filled out under the Universist’s programme, even if it is unclear exactly what
axioms we should pick globally.94
3 Denying Universism
Thus far, we have examined Universism; the idea that there is one universe of sets
that settles all truths about set theory. The time has come to consider some alter-
natives. There are several ways to cash out a denial of Universism. We’ll consider
variations of the following three:
Multiversism. There are multiple equally legitimate universes of set theory,
and no-one universe is especially privileged.
Potentialism. The subject matter of set theory is modally indefinite in different
ways (we say ‘subject matter’ here, rather than ‘universe of sets’, because as
we’ll see later, it’s not really clear whether we should identify Potentialism as
a view that thinks that there is one universe of sets that is indefinite, or that
thinks that there are multiple universes of sets that we can talk about modally).
Universe Indeterminism. There is one universe of sets, but it is indefinite (i.e.
not every claim about this one universe is determinately either true or false,
and possibly classical logic is not appropriate for reasoning in set theory across
the board).
We’ll consider variations of these views, arguments for and against them, and the
mathematical programmes they suggest in the rest of this section.
3.1 Multiversism
As stated above, Multiversism is the idea that our set-theoretic talk does not deter-
mine a unique universe up to isomorphism, but rather a plurality thereof. There are
various ways that we can cash this out, we’ll consider adding more ordinals (height
multiversism: §3.1.1), adding more subsets (width multiversism: §3.1.2), or even ad-
mitting non-standard universes as interpretations (§3.1.3).
3.1.1 Height multiversism
The first kind of multiversism we shall consider is multiversism concerning the
height of the hierarchy. This can be stated as follows:
Height Multiversism. For any universe of sets V , there is another uni-
verse of sets V ′ such that V ∈ V ′ and Ord(V ) ∈ V ′.
One natural species of Height Multiversism is Level Multiversism:
Level Multiversism. The universes of sets are well-ordered and any uni-
verse V is of the form Vκ ∈ V ′ for some height-extension of V .
93See [Steel, 2005] for the result.
94We lack the space to discuss this here, but looking at what can be ‘freezed’ (and hence lies in the
overlapping consensus) is part of the motivation behind Woodin’s use of Pmax and Ω-logic. For a concise
introduction and further reading, see [Koellner, 2019], §3.
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Under these kinds of multiversism; our reference to “the” universe of sets or
“V ”, should be understood as something like a free variable letter, standing for any
universe of the appropriate form. But what are the reasons for adopting Height
Multiversism?
The Paradoxes. The first is simply the paradoxes. On the Height Multiversist pic-
ture, it looks like there is no question of the interpretation of proper classes. This is
because, for any universe V , the ‘proper classes’ of V are garden-variety sets in some
height extension V ′ of V .
Similar consideration apply to long-well-orders over ‘the’ universe. If we are
Height Multiversists, we seem to have an easy answer to the problem of providing
an underlying ontology for a given definable long well-order. In particular, given
a particular universe V , a long-well-order defines an ordering longer than Ord(V )
that is represented by an ordinary set in some height extension V ′.
Moreover, irrespective of whether or not the Height Multiversist accepts an on-
tology of width extensions as well, she then has a way of interpreting width exten-
sions for any particular universe V . Because height extensions are always avaiable,
they can always take Hyp(V ) and use the resources of V -logic without any need for
coding in the class theory.95
However, one might question exactly how far the Height Multiversist response
to the paradoxes takes us. For the Height Multiversist, I want to say things like:
“Any universe V has an extension V ′ such that V ∈ V ′.”
However, in making this claim it seems like I quantify over all the universes.
What then is this domain over which I quantify? Isn’t ‘the collection of all universes’
just a proper class in different clothes? Exactly how to understand these issues and
whether this still constitutes a version of the problem of proper classes is a difficult
question. Since similar questions are well worn in the literature on absolute general-
ity,96 we’ll set this aside, however later (§3.2) we discuss the Potentialist response to
the problem via the use of modal resources.
The Quasi-Categoricity Theorem. A different motivation for a particular version
of Height Multiversism in fact comes from the Quasi-Categoricity Theorem. If one
thinks that categoricity is important for an account of how we refer to mathematical
objects97, then the following version of Level Multiversism is pertinent:
Inaccessible Level Multiversism. 98 By Inaccessible Level Multiversism we mean
the view that the universes are well-ordered, and that any universe V is of the
form Vκ in some larger universe V ′, in which κ is inaccessible.
One way of motivating Inaccessible Level Multiversism is to argue that the quasi-
categoricity (as opposed to full categoricity) of ZFC2 is indicative of the failure of
our thought and language to uniquely determine one universe of sets rather than a
plurality thereof. If one thinks that in order to determinately refer to or understand
95See here [Antos et al., 2015] and [Barton and Friedman, 2017].
96See citeRayoUzquiano2006a for a useful survey of the subject, and the essays contained in [Rayo and
Uzquiano, 2006a] for further detail.
97For just such a view see [Isaacson, 2011].
98This kind of Multiversism is often attributed to [Zermelo, 1930], but is clearly recently advanced by
[Hellman, 1989] (see Ch. 2), [Rumfitt, 2015] (see Ch. 9) and [Isaacson, 2011].
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a domain we have to provide a theory that pins it down, the quasi-categoricity the-
orem shows that no maximal domain is possible without bounding the number of
inaccessible cardinals.
This analysis of the significance of the quasi-categoricity theorem is often liked
to a diagnosis of the set-theoretic paradoxes. The paradoxes, one might think, are
another manifestation of the claim that our thought and language cannot pin down
a unique structure in terms of height, to do so (according to the Height Multiversist)
is incoherent and would produce a contradiction with other principles she holds.
The paradoxes thus show that our thought cannot pin down an intended structure
and the quasi-categoricity theorem shows why it does not; any natural theory of sets
(without anti-large cardinal axioms added that bound the number of inaccessible)
will only ever be quasi-categorical. So Zermelo writes:
Scientific reactionaries and anti-mathematicians have so eagerly and lov-
ingly appealed to the ‘ultrafinite antinomies’ in their struggle against set
theory. But these are only apparent ‘contradictions’, and depend solely
on confusing set theory itself, which is not categorically determined by
its axioms, with individual models representing it. What appears as an
‘ultrafinite non- or super-set’ in one model is, in the succeeding model,
a perfectly good, valid set with both a cardinal number and an ordinal
type, and is itself a foundation stone for the construction of a new do-
main. To the unbounded series of Cantor ordinals there corresponds a
similarly unbounded double-series of essentially different set-theoretic
models, in each of which the whole classical theory is expressed. The
two polar opposite tendencies of the thinking spirit, the idea of creative
advance and that of collection and completion [Abschluß], ideas which
also lie behind the Kantian ‘antinomies’, find their symbolic represen-
tation and their symbolic reconciliation in the transfinite number series
based on the concept of well-ordering. This series reaches no true com-
pletion in its unrestricted advance, but possesses only relative stopping-
points, just those ‘boundary numbers’ which separate the higher model
types from the lower. Thus the set-theoretic ‘antinomies’, when correctly
understood, do not lead to a cramping and mutilation of mathematical
science, but rather to an, as yet, unsurveyable unfolding and enriching of
that science. ([Zermelo, 1930], p. 1233)
This response to the paradoxes, appealing to both the quasi-categoricity theo-
rem and the paradoxes as revealing an unbounded sequence of equally legitimate
universes, works in tandem with the observation, identified in §1.2, that there is no
known greatest consistent large cardinal axiom. Because one can always assert that
some axiom or other holds within an inaccessible rank, we obtain a picture of set
theory on which we come to be able to define larger and larger domains on the basis
of stronger and stronger large cardinal axioms, but without ever isolating a unique
maximal universe.
3.1.2 Width Multiversism
Where Height Multiversism concerned the addition of ordinals (and hence ranks) to
models, Width Multiversism rather concerns how subsets can be added to universes.
We can state it as follows:
Width Multiversism. For any universe of sets V , there is a (are) uni-
verse(s) of sets V ′ such that V ⊂ V ′ and Ord(V ) = Ord(V ′).
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A quick remark first: Width Multiversism and Height Multiversism are not nec-
essarily orthogonal, and can be combined with one another. In fact certain math-
ematical facts may require one to commit to both. For example, suppose that one
thinks that the Shepherdson-Cohen minimal model is a legitimate universe.99 Even
adding two extra L-levels to this model will necessarily add reals.100 So this universe
cannot be extended in height to a new well-founded model without adding subsets
too. In contrast, any version of Level Multiversism will be inconsistent with Width
Multiversism.
Many natural versions of Width Multiversism are those that talk about the rele-
vant kinds of construction. For example, we might consider:
Set Forcing Multiversism. For any universe of sets V , and any forcing partial
order P ∈ V , there is a universe V ′ such that there is a generic filter G ∈ V ′ for
P and V ′ = V [G].
For class forcing, the situation becomes a little more complex, since we have to
say how the classes are expanded:
Class Forcing Multiversism. Let (V ,∈, CV ) be a universe with some collec-
tion of classes CV over this universe. Then if P is a class forcing partial order
in CV , then there is a universe (V [G],∈, CV [G]), such that G is generic for P
and is one of the classes of CV [G], and where V [G] consists of the interpreta-
tions of set-names in V using G, and CM[G] consists of the interpretations of
class-names in CM using G.
Hyperclass Forcing Multiversism can be defined similarly, since current accounts
of hyperclass forcing (e.g. [Antos and Friedman, 2017]) depend on performing class
forcings:
Hyperclass Forcing Multiversism. Let (V ,∈, CV ) be a universe satisfyingMK
with the Class Bounding Axiom added, that is correct about well-founded re-
lations (i.e. it is a β-model). Then if P is a hyperclass forcing partial order
codable in CV , then there is a universe (V [G],∈, CV [G]), such that G codes a
V -hyperclass-generic for (V ,∈,V).
The situation is slightly more difficult when it comes to sharps since we need to
talk about iterations, but it can be done:
]-Multiversism. Suppose that V contains enough large cardinals to sup-
port being generated by a sharp via an iteration of some length α. Then
there is a universe V ′ containing a sharp for V that generates V with an
iteration of length α.
We can see then that Width Multiversism refers to a large diversity of positions
(some of which imply each other; for instance Class Forcing Multiversism trivially
implies Set Forcing Multiversism). What then are the kinds of argument advanced
for Width Multiversism?
99The Shepherdson-Cohen minimal model is a countable transitive model of the form Lα |= ZFC
where α is the least such ordinal. This is the minimal transitive model of ZFC; it contains no other
transitive models of ZFC.
100This is because in a model Lβ |= ZFC, a first order sentence φ is true iff for some n, φ is Σn and
there exists a satisfaction predicate for Σn formulas witnessing this. These partial satisfaction predi-
cates are definable over Lβ , and hence a full satisfaction predicate exists in Lβ+2. Since every set in the
Shepherdson-Cohen minimal model Lα is definable, the satisfaction predicate appears as a new real at
Lα+2.
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Naturality and forcing. One source of considerations mobilised in favour of Width
Multiversism is the idea that it provides an especially natural interpretation of width
extensions such as forcing. For example, Hamkins writes:
“This abundance of set-theoretic possibilities poses a serious difficulty
for the universe view, for if one holds that there is a single absolute back-
ground concept of set, then one must explain or explain away as imagi-
nary all of the alternative universes that set theorists seem to have con-
structed. This seems a difficult task, for we have a robust experience in
those worlds, and they appear fully set theoretic to us. The multiverse
view, in contrast, explains this experience by embracing them as real, fill-
ing out the vision hinted at in our mathematical experience, that there is
an abundance of set-theoretic worlds into which our mathematical tools
have allowed us to glimpse.” ([Hamkins, 2012], p. 418)
and
“...a set theorist with the universe view can insist on an absolute back-
ground universe V , regarding all forcing extensions and other models
as curious complex simulations within it. (I have personally witnessed
the necessary contortions for class forcing.) Such a perspective may be
entirely self-consistent, and I am not arguing that the universe view is
incoherent, but rather, my point is that if one regards all outer models of
the universe as merely simulated inside it via complex formalisms, one
may miss out on insights that could arise from the simpler philosophical
attitude taking them as fully real.” ([Hamkins, 2012], p. 426)
The thought here is that a large part (if not the majority) of set-theoretic practice
involves the study of different universes satisfying axioms, and what can obtain from
these universes. So, for example, the original result of Cohen can be viewed as what
one can obtain given a universe satisfying CH. Whilst this can be coded (as outlined
in §2.3) often this is unnatural requiring “contortions” and not respecting the “math-
ematical experience”. On a Forcing Multiversist approach, however, both V and G
are uncontroversially available, and so reference can be completely transparent and
one can simply view the original universe being extended.
Further in this direction, we can point to the fact that many theorems and axioms
can be formulated in some variety of Width Multiversit Framework (as noted earlier
in §1.3 and §1.4). Whilst these theorems can be coded within the Universist frame-
work, it seems reasonable to say that the thinking that underlies them is Multiversist
in flavour. Perhaps then the most natural interpretation of the underlying subject
matter is a Multiversist one.
Analogy with other areas of mathematics. A different motivation for Width Multi-
versism is through analogies with historical episodes in mathematics. Two that have
been mobilised (especially in [Hamkins, 2012]) are the use of the complex plane with
respect to the real numbers, and independence of the Parallel Postulate (PP) with
respect to geometry.
The case of the complex numbers is roughly as follows. Shortly after the imagi-
nary numbers were introduced, they were viewed as ontologically not on the same
footing as the ordinary real numbers. What after all is
√−1? Descartes, for example,
writes:
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Neither the true nor the false roots are always real; sometimes they are
imaginary; that is, while we can always conceive of as many roots for
each equation as I have already assigned, yet there is not always a definite
quantity corresponding to each root so conceived of. Thus, while we may
conceive of the equation x3 − 6x2 + 13x − 10 = 0 as having three roots,
yet there is only one real root, 2, while the other two, however we may
increase, diminish, or multiply them in accordance with the rules just laid
down, remain always imaginary. ([Descartes, 1637], p. 175)
Thus Descartes holds that whatever the usefulness of reasoning using the rele-
vant algebraic rules and
√−1, there were not necessarily actual objects that under-
wrote the mathematics in question. Imaginary numbers were, according to Descartes,
literally not real.
It was soon realised, however, that they could be modelled using pairs of real
numbers (with a slightly modified definition of multiplication) and often they were
useful for solving problems about the reals. [Painleve´, 1900], for example, remarks:
The natural development of this work soon led the geometers in their
studies to embrace imaginary as well as real values of the variable. The
theory of Taylor series, that of elliptic functions, the vast field of Cauchy
analysis, caused a burst of productivity derived from this generalization.
It came to appear that, between two truths of the real domain, the easiest
and shortest path quite often passes through the complex domain.
The analogy then is the following: We should think of our current situation as
having the reals be some arbitrary universe of sets and
√−1 is analogous to G, and
V [G] is analogous to the field extension of R. Just as C can be simulated within R,
so can V [G] can be simulated within V (by one of the relevant coding methods).
However, moving to a perspective on which the complex plane is its own entity as
well is theoretically more elegant, and so we should do the same with V and V [G].
A salient response here comes from the foundational and universal role that set
theory is meant to play (especially from the Universist’s perspective). For the Uni-
versist, V is meant to encapsulate all the sets there are, which is quite unlike the
situation for those interested in R. There is no pressure, for example, to accept that
R2 is part of R, though the former can be coded in the latter. Similar considerations
apply to C, which was eventually understood in planar terms. This contrasts sharply
with V , which is meant to encapsulate all sets.
This response on behalf of the Universist will be unconvincing to the Width Mul-
tiversist, however. For the Width Multiversist, the situation is very analogous; there
are V -sets and V [G]-sets, just like there are real numbers and complex numbers.
Here we see a common theme amongst debates between the different foundational
viewpoints; namely a dialectic standoff. The analogy between complex numbers is
very convincing (and pedagogically helpful) to the theorist sympathetic to the Width
Multiversist’s project. However for the Universist, the response begs the question;
the analogy breaks down under her position. Similar considerations are at play if an
Anti-Width Multiversist appeals to the quasi-categoricity theorem for ZFC2. This
is convincing if one thinks that there is a domain of sets with a definite conception
of the available subsets of a set which is maximal under inclusion. However, if one
rejects this (as the Width Multiversist does) then all a quasi-categoricity theorem tells
you is that within a universe there is, up to isomorphism, just one conception of the
powerset operation up to some ordinal.
A different analogy is made between the independence of the Parallel Postulate
(PP) from the axioms of geometry and the independence of CH from ZFC. Prior to
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the 19th century, Euclidean geometry was largely regarded as true (of nature) and
especially epistemologically certain.101 In the 19th and 20th the independence of PP
from the other geometrical axioms was shown by the existence of non-Euclidean ge-
ometries. The observation that we can represent these geometries by modelling them
within Euclidean space along with the discovery that space-time was non-Euclidean
contributed to the acceptance of non-Euclidean geometries as equally legitimate al-
ternative geometrical structures. So, the thinking goes, with V and V [G]; we have
simulations of V [G] within V (e.g. via a Boolean-ultrapower and quotient structures)
and so should accept them.102
Again, the advocate of the Universist position is likely to be unmoved. A key fac-
tor here (as identified by [Kreisel, 1967]) is in the different behaviour of categoricity
arguments with respect to PP and CH. For, the independence proofs for geometry
show that PP is independent of the second-order axiomatisation. This is not so for
bounded set-theoretic statements like CH, where they have the same truth value in
all structures ofZFC2 with the full semantics. This is a salient difference between the
independence of CH and PP whether or not one thinks that CH has a definite truth-
value; the latter (within any model M of set theory) always has one truth value for
whatever M thinks is the full semantics for ZFC2, whereas the former always takes
different truth values in different models of the second-order axioms for geometry
within M.
3.1.3 Radical Multiversism
A further kind of Multiversism is the following:
Radical Multiversism. Any first-order structure satisfying the axioms ofZFC
is an equally legitimate universe of set theory.
Here, universes may disagree even on what holds concerning the natural num-
bers (for example, they might disagree on whether Con(ZFC) is true or false). One
universe can thus be non-well-founded relative to another. For the Radical Multi-
versist it is not just that the meaning of the powerset operation can vary between
different equally legitimate universes, but also that our notions of well-foundedness
and even natural number are indeterminate, and admit of various interpretations
contingent upon the universe under consideration. Hamkins, for example, expresses
himself as follows:
...although it may seem that saying “1, 2, 3, ... and so on,” has to do only
with a highly absolute concept of finite number, the fact that the struc-
ture of the finite numbers is uniquely determined depends on our much
murkier understanding of which subsets of the natural numbers exist. So
why are mathematicians so confident that there is an absolute concept of
finite natural number, independent of any set-theoretic concerns, when
all of our categoricity arguments are explicitly set-theoretic and require
one to commit to a background concept of set? My long-term expecta-
tion is that technical developments will eventually arise that provide a
forcing analogue for arithmetic, allowing us to modify diverse models
of arithmetic in a fundamental and flexible way, just as we now mod-
ify models of set theory by forcing, and this development will challenge
101e.g. In Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Hume, and Kant. See [Torretti, 2019] for a short introduc-
tion.
102This idea, formally expressed, it part of what [Hamkins, 2012] sees as a philosophical ramification of
his Naturalist Account of Forcing.
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our confidence in the uniqueness of the natural number structure, just as
set-theoretic forcing has challenged our confidence in a unique absolute
set-theoretic universe. ([Hamkins, 2012], p. 428)
There is a sense then in which a motivation for Radical Multiversism is a kind of
Skolemite position; only those notions that can be characterised absolutely in a first-
order manner have determinate meaning.103 Hence there is no determinate notion
of powerset, natural number, and finiteness, and the conception of each can vary
between universes.
This denial of the definiteness of some of the most basic notions of set theory
has some interesting ramifications. The fact that so much is relative has been used
by some authors as an objection to Radical Multiversism as an ontological position.
[Barton, 2016a] argues, for example, that there is a problem for Hamkins in that the
claim:
“Any first-order structure satisfying ZFC is a universe.”
is indeterminate. This is because, by the Radical Multiversist’s own lights, the notion
of finiteness is indeterminate and hence ZFC is indeterminate (since we depend on
the notion of finiteness for characterising the notion of well-formed formula and
proof). So it is unclear what the Radical Multiversist takes herself to be claiming.104
One proposed solution is to view Radical Multiversism not as a view about de-
scribing an ontology of a multiverse, but rather as proposing an algebraic concept of
set. We might think of set theory on the Radical Multiversist’s perspective as anal-
ogous to group theory in standard mathematics—it is studying algebraic properties
attaching to structures satisfying whatever their own version of ZFC is. In this way
we avoid the problem of having to articulate what is meant by ZFC independently
of a schematic commitment to the way the world of sets appears from the perspec-
tives of certain structures.
There are still significant problems for this view. Even if it resolves what is meant
by ZFC, it is still unclear what sense can be made of a universe ‘taking itself to
satisfy’ whatever is denoted by its own version of ZFC. This is because the analysis
of satisfaction also becomes highly non-absolute once we admit universes that look
non-standard from each other. Consider the following theorem:
Theorem 40. [Hamkins and Yang, 2013] Every consistent extension of ZFC has
two models M1 and M2, which agree on the natural numbers and on the structure
〈N, +,×, 0, 1,<〉M1 = 〈N, +,×, 0, 1,<〉M2 , but which disagree their theories of arith-
metic truth, in the sense that there is in M1 and M2 an arithmetic sentence σ, such
that M1 thinks σ is true, but M2 thinks it is false.105
This shows that even if we settle on what ZFC is, what a structure satisfies is still
contingent upon a particular notion of satisfaction built over it. It seems hard to
resolve this issue without using resources substantially beyond those that are coun-
tenanced as determinate by the Radical Multiversist. Whether there is a philosophi-
cally satisfactory response on behalf of the Radical Multiversist is an open question.
103This is suggested as a way of interpreting Hamkins’ responses to the categoricity arguments by [Koell-
ner, 2013], [Koellner, 2019], and [Barton, 2016a].
104[Koellner, 2019] (esp. §4.1) makes a similar point articulating the underlying theory for the Radical
Multiversist.
105This can be quite extreme, even to the point where M1 thinks a particular number is even whereas
M2 thinks that it is odd.
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3.2 Potentialism
Multiversists (of various stripes) take it that our set-theoretic thought and language
is about not one universe of sets, but many. Given a particular set-theoretic utterance,
it is natural for her to say that we are always restricted to some universe or other.
However, given this position, old worries about absolute generality in philoso-
phy emerge. For instance, the Multiversist might claim that we are always restricted
to a particular universe, and hence that we cannot quantify over all sets. But in
making this latter claim, they precisely do what they think is forbidden and seem to
quantify over some ‘super-universe’ of universes. We noted a similar problem when
discussing whether the Height Multiversist really resolves the problem of proper
classes (see §3.1.1). Another example, the Multiversist (of whatever kind) wants to
say things like:
“Every universe satisfies the Axiom of Extensionality.”
and this might be viewed as incoherent: She wants to quantify over the ‘collection’
of all universes whilst denying that there is any such domain. As mentioned before,
this issue has been considered extensively in the literature on absolute generality.106
One popular choice in that literature is the use of modal resources as devices of
generality, and Potentialism can be seen as an expression of this approach in the set-
theoretic case. Instead of holding that our talk about the universe of sets is always
implicitly restricted to some universe or other (and the multiverse visible from it)
one might hold that set theory is inherently modal.107
This idea behind Potentialism—that our talk about sets incorporates some no-
tion of possibility—suggests an approach on which we speak about possibilities using
modal operators without explicitly first-order quantifying over all sets. On this view,
our talk about sets is indefinitely extensible; a notion with a long history and contribu-
tions by multiple authors108. The rough idea is that any time we have some definite
collection of sets then we can form a set of all of them. This idea of it being possible to
take a set of any given things whatsoever appears, at first blush, to be modal.
The usual methodology is then to use modal operators into our language and in-
terpret set-theoretic quantification modally. So, for example, given a level version of
Potentialism (e.g. [Linnebo, 2010]), we can introduce the operators  and ♦ and lay
down an axiomatisation for their use (see §3.4.3 for more detail here). The intended
meaning of “♦φ” is “It is possible to go on to form sets so as to make it the case
that φ” and that of “φ” is “no matter what sets we go on to form it will remain the
case that φ”. We might then take the set theorist’s quantification in the language of
set theory to be modalised, so ∃xφ(x) should be interpreted as ♦∃xφ(x) and ∀xφ(x)
interpreted as ∀φ(x).
The exact manner in which we spell out the modal commitments of the Poten-
tialist can vary along two main arcs. For example, we could use operators looking in
106See [Rayo and Uzquiano, 2006b].
107This idea concerning infinity and plausibly goes back as far as Aristotle. See, for example, his remarks
in the Physics about infinity. e.g.
Our account does not rob the mathematicians of their science, by disproving the actual
existence of the infinite in the direction of increase, in the sense of the untraversable. In
point of fact they do not need the infinite and do not use it. They postulate only that a finite
straight line may be produced as far as they wish. It is possible to have divided into the
same ratio as the largest quantity another magnitude of any size you like. Hence, for the
purposes of proof, it will make no difference to them whether the infinite is found among
existent magnitudes. (Physics, Book III, 207b28–207b34)
108See [Shapiro and Wright, 2006] for an overview.
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different directions (e.g. [Studd, 2013] uses forward and backward modal operators
based on tense logic). A second direction in which these views can be modified is
by allowing different conceptions for the possible worlds and hence different modal
axioms. One might instead of viewing the possible worlds as constituted by levels
(in the manner of [Linnebo, 2010]) view any forcing extension of a given world as
possible. We discuss some technical ramifications of these different options in §3.4.3.
A salient question and challenge for the Potentialist is how to interpret the rele-
vant mathematical modality. If one is already a Multiversist of some stripe or other,
then it is relatively easy; one already has a collection of worlds (the relevant uni-
verses) and one can consider different kinds of accessibility relation between them
(we consider these in detail in §3.4.3). Also, given an account of modality for the
Potentialist, one can extract some interpretation of Multiversism simply by taking
the possible worlds to constitute elements of a multiverse.
Whilst the there are clear links between Multiversism and Potentialism, it is not
clear that they are the same philosophically. Firstly, Potentialism seems to have some
notion of operation iteration at its core and in it’s motivation; if we can form sets such
that φ then we should go ahead and do so. This seems to be partly what lies behind
the level version of Potentialism (where the generating operation is powerset) and
the forcing version of Potentialism (where the generating operation is the addition
of some generic set). Some versions of Multiversism, however, do not clearly have a
potentialist operation of generation underlying them (e.g. Radical Multiversism).
A different alternative to seeing the potentialist modal operators as underwritten
by some kind of Multiversism is to countenance a specifically mathematical kind of
modality. Often this is taken to be motivated by the iterative conception (at least in its
level form) which seems to have a modal flavour. However, this raises a challenge:
We require a philosophical explanation of how this mathematical modality should be
cashed out. This is not least because on many ordinary understandings of mathe-
matics, mathematical truth (and objects) are metaphysically necessary, and this rules
out the possibility of using standard metaphysical necessity to do the job. Nonethe-
less, some authors do take this approach, or opt for logical possibility (e.g. [Hellman,
2002]). A different option is to understand the modality as a way of individuating
mathematical objects (e.g. [Linnebo, 2010]), arguing that the existence of a condi-
tion for determining the extensionality of some plurality licences the introduction
of a new object. Alternatively one might view the modality as postulational (e.g.
[Fine, 2005]), arguing that we can expand ontologies by postulating new objects and
expanding our ontology, and the modality consists in moving between legitimate
postulations. [Studd, 2013] opts instead for cashing out the modality in linguistic
terms, arguing that it can be explained as liberalising the interpretation of our lexi-
con. It is an open question to what extent these interpretations are philosophically
satisfactory, if there are others, and whether or not there are relationships between
them.
The introduction of modal resources leads to another possible philosophical dif-
ference between Multiversism and Potentialism. The Multiversist clearly claims that
there are multiple equally legitimate universes of set theory. However, the Poten-
tialist might claim that there is just one universe of set theory, but that it is modally
indefinite, and the way we achieve generality about the universe is via modal claims
rather than outright quantification.109
109Whether these modal operators commit one to quantification is also open, and presents a possible
line of objection to the Potentialist.
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3.3 Universe Indeterminism
A different way of examining indefiniteness is simply by considering bivalence fail-
ure outright. We will call this view Universe Indeterminism:
Universe Indeterminism. There is just one universe of sets, but it is indefinite
(that is, not every sentence of set theory is either true or false in it; some are
neither true nor false).
This has recently suggested by [Scambler, 2020], who argues that a variant of
Feferman’s Semi-Constructive Set Theory110 provides an axiomatisation of this idea,
when combined with certain other motivating principles.
Universe Indeterminism has received relatively little attention; many construc-
tive mathematicians see their view as a repudiation of the notion of powerset con-
cerning infinite sets, rather than as an elucidations thereof.111 However, Universe
Indeterminism offers an alternative perspective on the categoricity arguments in
comparison to its multiversist counterparts. The Multiversist’s normal response to
categoricity is to deny that there is a unique interpretation of the second-order vari-
ables for a semantic categoricity proof, and for an internal categoricity proof to deny
that a second-order theory can apply outside of a particular universe. The Universe
Indeterminist can perfectly well accept quantification over all sets, however she can
reject the use of classical logic required to conduct the categoricity proof (including
an internal one).
3.4 Mathematical programmes associated with Anti-Universism
Given the various versions of Anti-Universism that we have seen, there are various
mathematical programmes associated with them. The list we shall provide is not
exhaustive, but it is useful to survey some in order to see the kinds of mathematics
that have arisen in the contexts of particular philosophies of mathematics.
3.4.1 Multiverse axiomatisations
The first kind of programme we shall consider are multiverse axiomatisations. These
seek to provide theories of multiverses, with variables ranging over universes as well
as sets. We mention those of Hamkins and Steel.
Hamkins’ list of Multiverse axioms is designed to provide a characterisation of
some of the principles held by the Radical Multiversist. He suggests the following
axiomatisation:
Definition 41. The Radical Multiverse Axioms112 consist of:
(i) Realizability Principle. Whenever M is a universe and N is a definable class
ofM , with a set-like membership relation, satisfying ZFC from the perspective
of M , then N is also a universe.
(ii) The Forcing Extension Axiom. Whenever M is a universe and P is a forcing
notion in M , then M has a forcing extension of M by P, a model of the form
M [G], where G is an M -generic filter for P.
110See here [Feferman, 2010].
111There are, of course, some exceptions here.
112These are called just the ‘Multiverse Axioms’ by [Gitman and Hamkins, 2010] and [Hamkins, 2012],
but we change their name (and their formulation, ever so slightly) to fit the present context.
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(iii) The Class Forcing Extension Axiom. Whenever M is a universe and P is a
ZFC-preserving class forcing notion P ⊆M , then M has a forcing extension of
M by P, a model of the form M [G], where G is an M -generic filter for P.
(iv) The Countability Axiom. For every universe M there is another universe N
such that M is a countable set in N .
(v) The Wellfoundedness Mirage Axiom. For every universe M , there is another
universe N which thinks M is a set with an non-well-founded ω.
Given the existence of a measurable cardinal, there will also be universes cor-
responding to various ultrapowers, and so one can also consider:
(vi) The Reverse Ultrapower Axiom. For every universe M there is a universe N
such that M is the internal ultrapower of N by an ultrafilter on ω in N .
(vii) The Strong Reverse Ultrapower Axiom. Every universe M1 and every ultrafil-
ter U1 in M1 on a set X1 ∈ M1, there is a universe M0 with an ultrafilter U0 on
a set X0 such that M1 is the internal ultrapower of M0 by U0, sending U0 to U1.
(viii) The Reverse Embedding Axiom. For every universe M1 in M and every em-
bedding j1 : M1 →M2 definable in M1 from parameters and thought by M1 to
be elementary, there is a universe M0 and similarly definable j0 : M0 → M1 in
M0 such that j1 is the iterate of j0, meaning j1 = j0(j0).
[Gitman and Hamkins, 2010] show that the Radical Multiverse Axioms are re-
alised (within some model of ZFC) in the collection of all countable computably sat-
urated models of ZFC. One can see how the axioms (with variables for universes)
realise some of the key features of Radical Multiversism; the natural numbers are
not determinate since every universe is ω-nonstandard from the perspective of an-
other, and universes can disagree wildly on claims about satisfaction and whether a
universe satisfies ZFC. For example, since a universe N may disagree with another
M on what the axioms of ZFC are, N might think that M (which satisfies its own
versions of ZFC) violates ZFC.113
The approach of Steel is slightly different. Whilst Hamkins holds thatCH does not
have a truth value independent of the universe in which it is assessed, he nonethe-
less holds that it is a definite mathematical problem. The answer to CH, for Hamkins,
consists in our detailed knowledge of how it behaves within the multiverse (even if
there are some open questions as to whether or not it holds in certain universes).
Steel, on the other hand, takes the independence phenomenon concerning CH, and
in particular the fact that it cannot be resolved on the basis of known large cardinal
axioms, as evidence that it is not a definite mathematical problem.114 Steel’s mul-
tiverse axiomatisation is thus designed to shift the language to one on which we
cannot obviously formulate CH.
Definition 42. The Steel Multiverse Axioms have variables for sets (x, y, z,x0, ...,xn, ...)
and universes (V ,W ,V0, ...,Vn, ...), and are as follows:
(i) φW , for every world W (for each axiom φ of ZFC).
113This indicates part of the problem for the Radical Multiversist; the correctness of the axioms for a
certain class of universes can only be evaluated from a prior fixed model of set theory.
114This is because given a measurable cardinal κ there is a forcing that modifies the truth value of CH
whilst leaving the measurability of κ untouched. See [Le´vy and Solovay, 1967] for the result, and [Steel,
2014] (p. 163) for Steel’s remarks.
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(ii) (a) Every world is a transitive proper class. An object is a set only in the case
that it belongs to some world.
(b) If W is a world and P ∈ W is a forcing poset, then there is a world of the
form W [G], where G is P-generic over W .
(c) If U is a world, and U = W [G], where G is P-generic over W for a forcing
poset P ∈W , then W is a world.
(d) (Amalgamation) If U and W are worlds, then there are sets G and H that
are generic filters in them (for some PU ∈ U and PW ∈ W ) such that
W [G] = U [H].
Steel’s axiomatisation thus corresponds to a species of Width Multiversism (namely
Set Forcing Multiversism), but a denial of Height Multiversism and Radical Multi-
versism. The relevant universes are given by transitive proper class models of ZFC,
but universes cannot be extended in height, and the natural numbers are determi-
nate.
Within Steel’s system, there is no natural analogue of CH that can be formulated,
however if we additionally accept that a universe contains a proper class of Woodin
cardinals (and hence every universe contains such a class, since one can only destroy
boundedly-many Woodin cardinals using set forcing) every universe will addition-
ally satisfy ADL(R).
A salient difference between Steel’s axiomatisation and that of the Radical Multi-
versist is the prohibition of class forcing extensions. Steel’s reason for this is that the
ground model need not be definable in the class forcing extension.115 In this way,
allowing class forcing extensions implies that what is first-order visible can depend
upon where one is located in the multiverse (thus the prohibition on class forcing is
important in formulating (ii)(c)). Steel argues that this means that information can
be ‘lost’ when moving to a class forcing extension.
A second salient difference is that within the Radical Multiversist’s framework,
one can have universes V [G] and V [H] such that there is no third universe satisfying
ZFC containing both G and H , and with the same ordinal height as V . This is
because G and H can be Cohen reals coding a collapse of Ord(V ) to ω.116
One can obtain a model for Steel’s axioms by taking a countable transitive model
M ofZFC, and considering the extensionM[G] whereG is generic forCol(ω,< Ord(M)).
We can then, inM[G], consider a multiverse composed of the worldsW [H] = M[G  α],
for some W -generic H and α ∈ Ord(M).117
3.4.2 Multiverse accounts of truth
Woodin’s approach is slightly different again. Rather than providing an explicit ax-
iomatisation, he proposes to examine the perspective on which a sentence is true iff
it is true in all models of the generic multiverse obtained by set forcing. He shows
how this is accessible from any given universe, in particular showing that:
Theorem 43. [Woodin, 2011] For each sentence φ there is a sentence φ∗, recursively
depending on φ, such that for each countable transitive set M such that M |= ZFC,
the following are equivalent:
(1.) M |= φ∗
115See here [Antos, 2018].
116See [Mostowski, 1976] for the result.
117For the details, see [Steel, 2014], p. 166.
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(2.) For every N in the generic multiverse generated by M , N |= φ.
Whilst this analysis of truth is multiversist in spirit, it is nonetheless examined
for the sake of an attempted reductio:[Woodin, 2011] then uses his characterisation
of the generic multiverse to argue that (modulo the Ω-conjecture) the position is not
satisfactory.
A different option to a set-generic multiversist analysis of truth is to consider
the hyperuniverse; the collection of all countable transitive models of ZFC. Here
[Arrigoni and Friedman, 2013] argue that we can distinguish between ‘de facto’ and
‘de jure’ set-theoretic truths. The former are those axioms that we take to be non-
revisable (e.g. the axioms of ZFC) and the latter comprise those truths that we may
come to accept on the basis that they hold in certain elements of the hyperuniverse
with preferable properties (e.g. the kind of powerset maximality one might think
follows from the IMH).118 The use of the hyperuniverse is one on which all universes
are well-founded, but nonetheless is both height and width multiversist. Again,
whilst no explicit axiomatisation is provided (what the hyperuniverse looks like will
depend a good deal on the initial universe in which it is analysed), the contention is
that examination of this structure is useful for elucidating set-theoretic truth. There is
a question of whether or not the use of the hyperuniverse in analysing set-theoretic
truth is committed to Height or Width Multiversism (see [Antos et al., 2015] and
[Antos et al., S] for arguments that it may be used in the absence of one or both these
ontologies), but nonetheless it is methodologically speaking multiversist; seeking to
analyse set-theoretic truth by studying a multiplicity of universes.
Both these approaches are not explicit axiomatisations, but provide the resources
to analyse a particular structure, and assess what kinds of truth conditions we might
take, or what they tell us about set-theoretic truth. In this sense, by elucidating a
particular structure on Multiversist grounds, they seek to inform philosophical con-
siderations with mathematical ones.
3.4.3 Using modality
Given any sort of Potentialism (either obtained from some variety of Multiversism or
by taking modal resources as primitive) we can examine various projects involving
properties of the relevant modalities involved.
Modal results in potentialism. One direction is to study the kinds of modal logics
that arise from different potentialist systems. Hamkins and Lo¨we for example found
that the set of modal validities of set-theoretic forcing (i.e. where “φ” is the claim
that in every set-forcing extension φ is true, and “♦φ” means that φ is forceable)
was S4.2. More recently [Hamkins and Linnebo, 2018] showed that Level Poten-
tialism and Inaccessible Level Potentialism (with inclusion the accessibility relation)
validate exactly S4.3, the natural potentialism associated with the hyperuniverse is
S4.2.119
A second kind of project is to provide a modal theory of sets, and see what kinds
of normal set theory can be interpreted in this framework (with the set theorist’s ex-
istential quantifier ∃ interpreted as ♦∃, and the universal quantifier interpreted as
∀ in the modal set theory). Results here include the fact that a level-based version
of Potentialist set theory formulated using plural resources proves potentialist trans-
lations of ZF ([Linnebo, 2013] building on work in [Parsons, 1983]) and is relatively
118See [Friedman, 2016] for some of these conditions.
119See [Hamkins and Linnebo, 2018] for details and some further modal validities.
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consistent with it. A similar result was shown independently by [Studd, 2013] who
uses a tenselike modal logic (with forward and backward looking operators and, un-
like Parsons and Linnebo, no higher-order resources) to formalise a modalised stage
theory which is able to derive the (modalised) axioms of ZF. These formalisations
of Level Potentialism have recently been extended by [Scambler, S] who considers
a version of Potentialism with a vertical and horizontal modality (with horizontal
modality understood as forceability) and shows that a natural modal set theory of
this form interprets ZFC-Powerset+“Every set is countable”, but can interpret ZF
when the modality is restricted.
Potentialist Maximality Principles. We can also use Multiverse/Potentialist re-
sources in formulating axioms. Some natural candidates have already been dis-
cussed in the context of axioms that make apparent use of extensions in their formu-
lations (§1.4). However, the explicit use of modal resources allows us to formulate
some additional axioms using these resources.
One example comes from potentialist maximality principles. Earlier, we discussed
how CH was like a ‘switch’ that could be turned off or on by forcing. As a counter-
point to switches we have buttons; statements that can be made true by moving to
some possible world, but once turned on cannot be turned off again. Examples of
buttons (given the modal structure of Set-Forcing Potentialism) include V 6= L, or
|α| = ω, for some ordinal parameter α.
These modal resources allow us to state axioms in the modalised language. For
instance:
Axiom 44. [Hamkins, 2003] (The Potentialist Maximality Principle.)120 ♦φ→ φ.
This axiom scheme states that every button has been pushed, and over S4 (the
lower bound for modal validities of most potentialist systems) is equivalent to the
additional axioms for S5. In the context of Set Forcing Potentialism, if no parameters
are allowed in φ, then the statement is equiconsistent with ZFC, unrestricted param-
eters results in contradiction (just collapse ω1), and allowing real parameters yields
some large cardinal strength (it is equiconsistent with statement “Ord is Mahlo”).
The assertion that the Maximality Principle with real parameters is necessary (i.e.
true in every forcing extension) has consistency strength well above 0] (in fact above
infinitely many Woodin cardinals). Interestingly, even the lightface principle implies
that for known large cardinal principles, either there is a proper class of them, or
none (since any bounded number of some kind of large cardinal can be collapsed
by forcing).121 Moreover, a shift in the kind of Potentialism being considered results
in a shift in the meaning of the Maximality Principle. For example, if one is a Level
Potentialist, the assertion that a world W = Vα satisfies the maximality principle
is equivalent to the claim that α is Σ3-correct (in the non-modalised set theory). If
parameters from Vα are allowed, we obtain the result that α is a correct cardinal.
Modal Structural Reflection. A second kind of axiom that can be defined using
modal resources are principles arising in the context of a modal structuralism. Briefly
put, Modal Structuralism is the idea that mathematics is concerned with logically
possible structures composed of non-abstract objects. If the Modal Structuralist then
wishes to interpret normal mathematics, she must provide a translation of mathematics—
including set theory—that eliminates the apparent reference to abstract objects in
favour of talk of logical possibility and non-abstract objects.
120This terminology is due (as far as I am aware) to [Hamkins and Linnebo, 2018].
121See [Hamkins, 2003] for these results.
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Some Modal Structuralist views of this kind (e.g. [Hellman, 1989] and [Hellman,
1996]) represent versions of Height Potentialism, since they assert that whenever I
have some objects, it is logically possible for those objects to form a set (under the
relevant modal paraphrase). The Modal Structuralist, in this context122, aims to in-
terpret (second-order) ZFC2, using logically possible structures, where a structure
is thought of as a (coded) pair of pluralities; some things as a domain together with
some ordered pairs (coded via mereological fusions) as a membership relation. The
language thus contains a modal operator ♦ expressing logical possibility, and then
the required logical resources of first-order logic, plural logic, and a suitable mere-
ology. Using these resources, the Modal Structuralist lays down axioms concerning
structures, consisting of the usual axioms of the logics above (with a positive free
version of S5 and the Plural Comprehension Schema expanded to the larger vocabu-
lary), the usual axioms concerning the behaviour of the codings of ordered pairs (e.g.
that two pairs are identical just in case they have the same elements at the same co-
ordinates), modal axioms concerning the behaviour of pluralities and fusions across
worlds (namely that (i) pluralities cannot exist without their elements and without
continuing to comprise these elements, (ii) an extensionality principle for plurali-
ties holds, and (iii) the mereological fusions playing the role of ordered pairs cannot
change their parts) and the following axioms concerning structures (letting upper
case Latin variables X , Y , etc. range over coded structures):123
First the Modal Structuralist wants an axiom asserting the existence of at least
one structure:
Existence. ♦∃M(M = M)
Second, they provide an axiom that diagnoses the paradox along potentialist
lines: Any structure could form a set in some end-extension. Let “X ′ w X” de-
note the paraphrase of the claim that X ′ is an end-extension of X , “x ≡ X” denote
the paraphrase that the set x and plurality X contain exactly the same things, and
“M |= φ” denote the claim that the structure M satisfies φ. Then we can define:
The Extendability Principle. ∀M∀X ⊆M♦∃M ′ wM∃x ∈M ′(M ′ |= x ≡ X)
This theory (plus a claim concerning the stability of modal paraphrases between
structures) is known as Modal Structural Set Theory or MSST. Recently, after pre-
sentingMSST, [Roberts, 2019] proved:
Theorem 45. [Roberts, 2019]MSST interprets exactlyZ+“Every set belongs to some
Vα”+“There are unboundedly many inaccessible cardinals”. However,MSST does
not prove all Π1-instances of the Collection scheme.
So this version of Potentialism, whilst it has some strength, fails to interpret
some important set-theoretic axioms. An attempt to strengthen MSST is proposed
by [Hellman, 2015], who considers the following Modal Reflection Principle (let φpt
stand for the modal paraphrase of the set-theoretic sentence φ)124:
Modal Structural Reflection. If φ is syntactically consistent with ZFC2 (i.e.
(ZFC2 6` ¬φ)pt) then:
φpt → ♦∃M(M |= φ).
122From hereon out, by ‘Modal Structuralism’ I mean the versions presented in [Hellman, 1989] and
[Hellman, 1996], as well as the cluster of views considered by [Roberts, 2019].
123This characterisation follows [Roberts, 2019].
124pt here stands for “Putnam-translation” since the relevant translation first occurs in [Putnam, 1967].
See [Hellman, 1989] (p. 76) for the details.
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This provides a modal structural version of the usual idea of a reflection principle
reflecting statements from the universe to initial segments thereof. However recently
Roberts showed the following:
Theorem 46. [Roberts, 2019] MSST with Modal Structural Reflection added is in-
consistent.
It may be that there are strong reflection principles that can be formulated under
the kind of Potentialism provided by Modal Structuralism (though [Roberts, 2019]
presents some difficult challenges for an advocate of this idea). The question remains
open.
Set-theoretic geology. Another kind of mathematics suggested by the Multiver-
sist perspective (in particular various kinds of Forcing Multiversism) is set-theoretic
geology. The metaphor of geology suggests delving deep underground, and this pro-
gramme concerns the study of how a particular universe V can arise through forcing,
and how it sits within a particular forcing multiverse.
In the original paper of [Fuchs et al., 2015], the authors are almost exclusively
concerned with set-generic forcing extensions and the set-generic multiverse. Here
we can define:
Definition 47. (ZFC) [Fuchs et al., 2015] A class W is a ground of V iff V is obtained
by set forcing over W , that is if there is some P ∈ W and W -generic filter for P such
that V = W [G].
We can then consider various geological structures such as bedrocks (a ground
that is minimal with respect to the forcing-extension relation) and the mantle (the
intersection of all grounds). [Fuchs et al., 2015] prove several facts about the geolog-
ical properties models may possess. In particular, whilst these properties seem to be
second-order (since they concern relationships between classes), many can be given
first-order formulations (often using the Laver definability of the ground model in a
forcing extension).
Whilst one can study set-generic multiverses from within a given model in first-
order terms, we might consider generalisations of the idea of geology to other ex-
tensions. [Fuchs et al., 2015] goes some way towards this, considering the structure
present when we allow pseudo-grounds into the picture: models that have certain
covering and approximation properties that facilitate the definability of the ground
model in the (possibly class) forcing extension, despite the fact that in general Laver
definability can fail in class forcing extensions.125
Recently, Usuba showed that the Downward Directed Grounds Hypothesis (that any
two grounds have a common ground) and the Set-Downward Directed Grounds Hy-
pothesis (that a set-sized parameterised family of grounds have a common ground)
follow from ZFC. This result resolves many of the open questions concerning set-
theoretic geology.126 It is thus an interesting open question exactly how things can
be developed by relaxing the consideration of the set-generic multiverse and its
grounds to something more broad such as a consideration of pseudo-grounds.
4 Pluralism
Thus far we have considered interelated ontological positions; Universism, Multiver-
sism, Potentialism, and Universe Indeterminism. We can, however, distinguish a
125See [Antos, 2018].
126See [Usuba, 2017] for details.
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further related position:
Pluralism. We should tolerate multiple competing theories of sets, and not
necessarily identify one as privileged.
One would think, right off the bat, that Pluralism best meshes with a Multiver-
sism (or Potentialism) that countenances the satisfaction of multiple different the-
ories in different equally legitimate universes (or worlds). In this case, we have
different equally legitimate places to interpret set theoretic discourse, and different
theories are true there.
Things are more complicated than this for both the Multiversist, Potentialist, and
Universist, however. Firstly, for the Potentialist, as we saw in the last section, she can
find interpretations of her potentialist framework with other systems of set theory,
and might therefore maintain that there is a privileged theory of sets given the modal
paraphrase. There is thus not necessarily pressure for certain kinds of Potentialist to
be pluralists. For example, the Potentialisms provided by [Hellman, 1989] accepts
a determinate truth value for CH, in virtue of the acceptance of full second-order
quantification.
For the Multiversist, again things are not quite so simple as having multiple dif-
ferent universes entailing multiple different theories. For, in certain contexts, she
might assert that all preferential universes in the multiverse satisfy the same theory.
For example, if a multiversist programme nonetheless allows for the justification of
new axioms (e.g. [Arrigoni and Friedman, 2013]), then the view can be more or less
pluralist, as more axioms come to be accepted. In this way, it might be that one is
a Multiversist without being a Pluralist (say if one thinks that there is an optimal
set theory, even if one thinks that there are multiple equally legitimate universes in
which it is instantiated).
Universism, we might think, cuts in exactly the opposite direction. If one thinks
that every statement of first-order set theory has a determinate answer, then one can
easily argue that there is a unique privileged set theory; the true one. However,
whilst there is an argument for an Anti-Pluralism of this truth-theoretic kind, one
might nonetheless endorse a methodological Pluralism and tolerate the use of different
theories. For example [Barton, 2017] argues that a Universist should nonetheless
be a methodological Pluralist in virtue of the kinds of ways in which she might be
ignorant, and should tolerate many different theories of sets (at least for now) in
making her justificatory case.
5 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, we’ve seen that there are several considerations concerning how we
should interpret talk about ‘the’ universe of sets, and several ways of interpreting
these considerations via either Universism, Multiversism, Potentialism, or Universe
Indeterminism, with ramifications for Pluralism. Fundamentally, these questions
concern what our talk of set theory is like. Is it algebraic (like group theory) and con-
cerned with multiple different non-isomorphic structures, or rather is it concerned
with a single intended structure? If it is concerned with multiple non-isomorphic
structures, how much is determinate? Answers to these questions motivate many
different philosophical and mathematical questions.
I want to leave the reader with a final point, and possible direction for future
research. Each kind of view advocates a different way of interpreting set-theoretic
language. But should we really suggest that set-theoretic language has a univocal
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best interpretation? Perhaps we can view each philosophical viewpoint concerning
the nature of subject matter as advocating a new and different concept of set, each
of which can serve as a legitimate interpretation in different contexts. For example,
perhaps the Radical Multiversist can be viewed as advocating an algebriac concept
of set using the language of set theory, and the Universist uses set-theoretic lan-
guage in a very different way. It is not clear, without the further commitment that
set-theoretic language should always be interpreted similarly in foundations, that
the different foundational views concerning set theory are truly in tension with one
another. Nonetheless, it is not obvious how one might combine these different per-
spectives into a unified foundational framework, and there are many open questions
to be resolved concerning how the perspectives relate, and indeed if there is in fact
an optimal such view.
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